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The publication The Eastern Partnership in the context of the European Neighbour-
hood Policy and V4 Agenda initiated by The Kosciuszko Institute and prepared jointly 
with the consortium of European think tanks – the Europeum Institute for European 
Policy and Centre for EU Enlargement Studies with invited experts, aims to present 
a project of the European Union – the Eastern Partnership (EaP) as an initiative active-
ly supported by the Visegrad Group (V4) countries.
Since its establishment, the European Union has been representing an arena for 
the sharp exchange of particular interests of the member states, which determines 
the dynamics and shape of European integration. With the accession of the new 
member states, whose national strategies emerged from diff erent historical back-
grounds, geopolitical circumstances and internal economic progress, a map of exter-
nal EU interests became not only wider, but also distinctively developed along new 
trends. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the most important instrument 
of the European External Policy has been a subject of internal tensions between the 
old and the new member states, as it does not off er any accession perspective for the 
strategic partners of the latter. Diff erent approaches towards the new EU neighbours 
have become apparent in the regionalization process of the ENP, in the Eastern Part-
nership established in March 2009, as well as the Union for the Mediterranean and 
the Black Sea Synergy. Despite these disagreements, the EaP remains a platform for 
constructive cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe within the auspices of the V4. 
Historical and political perspectives, recalled in this publication, point out that 
EaP has been one of the most important initiatives of the EU external policy, in which 
Polish, Czech and Hungarian authorities cooperated with each other. In this process 
every country played a signifi cant role, which has been presented in this publication 
through experts familiar with the local political environments and European aims 
of their countries. The comparative study on Polish, Czech and Hungarian actions 
shows that the Eastern dimension of the ENP, understood as an aspiration for buil-
Izabela Albrycht – Vice-Chairman of the Board in the 
Kosciuszko Institute, political scientist (M.A. degree in the 
Institute of Political Science and International Relations 
of the Jagiellonian University), specialist in Public 
Relations (non-degree professional studies in the Tischner 
European University). Preparation of a PhD thesis in the 
Institute of Political Science and International Relations of 
the Jagiellonian University.
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ding sensible political bounds with the Eastern neighbours, and for democratization 
and reform assistance in the region of the Eastern Europe, is a key priority of external 
policy realized in the EU arena by these three countries. The priority diff ers however, 
according to geographical factor (some member states support the entire region wi-
thout exceptions, some are biased in favour of chosen countries) and area factor (the 
scope of cooperation includes their economic aims).
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, whose positions in the subject of 
Eastern Partnership were presented in a detailed manner in the publication, are the 
new EU member states. It is particularly interesting to follow their activities and effi  -
ciency in realizing their national interests on the EU forum. It enables to determine 
the extent to which these countries have moved in the adaptation process within the 
EU political system and address some fundamental questions. How much did they 
progress in terms of “learning the EU” (formal eff ectiveness) or in terms of familiarity 
with the European political game (informal eff ectiveness)?
The publication helps to perceive whether during the fi rst fi ve years after acces-
sion, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary have set the stamp on the EU agenda 
and if they have been successful in determining their domains in European politics. 
Furthermore, the question is whether they took advantage of their joint capacity 
performed within the V4, that they contributed to before the EU enlargement and 
which then represented their strong political support in reaching the mutual aspira-
tions. In other words, is V4 an institutionally useful tool on the EU arena and have the-
ir member states been capable of shaping a tactical force out of solidarity towards 
their common goals? The Polish, Czech and Hungarian potentials were presented in 
a particularly interesting way as V4 partners in supporting and developing Eastern 
Dimension of the ENP, including deepening cooperation with the Eastern European 
countries within the EaP. All these eff orts may bare fruit in 2011.
Next year is essential for Polish and Hungarian European Politics, since the Hun-
garian presidency will precede the Polish presidency in the EU. Our common political 
goals in the fi eld of realizing the EaP and the ENP premises need an active support 
from V4 partners. This is a considerable factor conditioning the success of the fi rst 
Hungarian and Polish leaderships of the EU. Moreover, it has a vital sense for consoli-
dating the regional development, social and political priorities in Eastern Europe, and 
for specifying them more precisely on the EU agenda, as well as in the external poli-
cies and initiatives. The presidency of both Hungary and Poland will be sort of a test 
of their European, regional and neighbourly cooperation.
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The Eastern Partnership as an initiative at the EU level was one of the core prio-
rities of the Czech EU presidency in the arena of external relations. The fact that the 
initiative was endorsed by the March European Council and that the fi rst Eastern 
Partnership summit took place in Prague on 7 May 2009 illustrates how much im-
portance was attached to this new EU policy by the Czech political representation. 
This article will try to explain in more detail the role of the Czech Republic in building 
the Eastern partnership, as well as strategic considerations underpinning Czech po-
sition, their major interests and ambitions concerning the contents of this initiative. 
This would be impossible without examining a broader context of the Czech “Eastern 
policy” in the past years. 
The place of the “Eastern factor” in the Czech foreign policy
The Czech Eastern policy has been characterized by rather low profi le, at least 
compared to other Visegrad countries, in course of 1990’s and at the beginning of 
21st century. This is explicable by several factors. First of all, symbolically there was 
a need to distance itself from the East to prove the European credentials under the 
motto of “return to Europe”1. Secondly, the Czech Republic as the only country in 
1 Petr Drulák, Elsa Tulmets, Michal Kořan: The Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic towards the 
Eastern Neighbourhood. Hungarian Institute of International Relations, 
THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND THE EASTERN 
PARTNERSHIP – FROM A BY-PRODUCT TO A 
BELOVED CHILD?
David Král - director of EUROPEUM Institute for European 
Policy, master in law from the Law Faculty at Charles 
University in Prague. He lectured at the Metropolitan 
University in Prague and at the Charles University - Faculty 
of Social Sciences. During the work of the Convention 
on the Future of Europe and the Intergovernmental 
Conference 2003/2004 he was a member of advisory 
groups of the MFA and the Prime Minister, and member 
of an advisory group on foreign relations to the Vice-
Premier for EU aﬀ airs before and during the Czech EU 
presidency in 2009. 
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the region does not have a direct geographical boundary with any of the current EU 
Eastern neighbours. Thus, after the division of Czechoslovakia in 1992, the issue of 
relations with Eastern countries (in this context meaning newly independent states 
of former Soviet Union) became much less salient in the Czech discourse. There is no 
substantive Czech minority residing in any of the countries currently falling under 
the Eastern partnership (unlike Hungarians or Poles living in Ukraine), nor is there any 
substantial Eastern ethnic minority living in the Czech Republic, like the Ruthenians 
in Slovakia and Poles or Ukrainians in the Eastern Poland. Possible threats stemming 
from the Eastern neighbourhood (political instability, frozen confl icts, security and 
environmental threats or migration pressures) also resonated much less intensively 
in the Czech Republic than in other countries of the region. The situation has been 
changing only since early 2000’s when a signifi cant infl ux of migrant workers espe-
cially from Ukraine into the Czech Republic started. This again brought more salien-
ce to Eastern policy, especially in terms of visa and residence issues concerning the 
citizens of the Eastern European countries. However, this issue was mainly conside-
red an internal security matter and as such handled by the interior ministry without 
strong co-ordination with the Ministry of foreign aff airs.
Secondly, at the beginning of 1990’s following the dissolution of COMECON (Co-
uncil of Mutual Economic Assistance), the Czech Republic has almost completely 
abandoned the markets of former Soviet Union states while keeping up the trade 
relations with former socialist countries (especially Slovakia, Poland and Hungary 
through the establishment of CEFTA2) and trying to expand to Western markets. The 
latter was largely facilitated by the association with the European Community (EC) 
and entry into force of the European agreement with the EC in February 1995. Due 
to the absence of borders with Eastern countries which would allow for developing 
of small cross-border trade and lack of interest of the biggest Czech companies in 
trading with or investing in this region, there was no economic impulse to develop 
stronger political ties with East European states. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the overall imperatives of the Czech fo-
reign policy in late 1990’s until the EU accession in 2004 were to subordinate all the 
foreign policy eff orts to joining the EU and NATO. This somehow hampered the am-
bition to develop an autonomous Czech Eastern policy, not least because of the fear 
that it could somehow undermine or endanger the Czech aspirations to join both 
blocks. One example clearly illustrating this is the issue of visas. In the framework of 
negotiating Justice and Home Aff airs chapter, the European Commission made it 
clear that the candidate countries would have to comply with the visa legislation of 
the EU. That would imply introducing visas for many East European countries that 
2 CEFTA – Central European Free Trade Area
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maintained visa free regime with the EU candidates, mainly as a result of agreements 
from the times of the socialist bloc. The Czech Republic has renounced most of these 
visa free agreements in 2000 practically overnight, justifying this step by the requ-
irements imposed by the EU3. Poland and Hungary have, on the other hand, opted 
for a diff erent approach (particularly in relation to Ukraine and Moldova), delaying 
the imposition of visas very close to the actual date of EU accession (only in 2003). 
This illustrates to a large degree the unwillingness of the Czech Republic to develop 
its own Eastern policy should it be perceived as undermining its own accession pro-
cess4, although one could probably argue that Poland and Hungary had more com-
pelling reasons for postponing the introduction of visas. 
A certain comeback of Eastern policy can be witnessed in the Czech foreign po-
licy discourse after the EU accession in 2004. Once the goal of the EU accession was 
accomplished, the Czech foreign policy was clearly lacking a vision or a priority that 
could be projected through the EU level. The Czech diplomacy tried to build on the 
fact that as a relatively small country with limited resources, its priorities for the EU 
foreign policy have to be well targeted, effi  ciently articulated and the Czech Republic 
has to have credibility and clear added value for pursuing them. These “niches” where 
the Czech Republic wanted to take a stronger profi le in the EU include particularly 
promotion of democracy and transformation using the Czech experience, mainta-
ining a close transatlantic link or strong EU involvement in Western Balkans leading 
to eventual EU accession of the countries in the region. Developing relations with 
Eastern neighbours was identifi ed as another issue, mainly due to certain historical 
and cultural links with the region, as well as due to good knowledge of the situation 
on the ground thanks to intensive contacts from the socialist era. However, the low 
profi le of the Czech Eastern policy in 1990’s and early 2000 somehow undermined 
the credibility of this choice. For instance, Poland was much more active in contribu-
ting to the fi rst Commission communications on the Wider Europe and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy5, even before the EU accession. Polish delegation worked ma-
3 The issue of introducing visas to citizens of Eastern European countries was subject of the meeting 
of Visegrád prime ministers in the High Tatras in October 1999 in search of fi nding a coordinated 
approach among V4. While the Czech and Slovak PMs were in favour of an early introduction, the 
Polish and Hungarian PMs were arguing for their postponement. Eventually, there was no co-ordi-
nated approach of V4 with Czech Republic and Slovakia introducing visa for Ukraine in 2000 while 
Poland and Hungary only in 2003. 
4 On the other hand, other examples show that on some foreign policy issues the Czech Republic 
took a more assertive stance, such as duting the Iraq crisis in 2003. However, the Czech position 
was more ambivalent and nuanced, and there was a cleavage across the then EU as well. 
5 For instance in 2003, the Polish MFA circulated a non-paper on „Eastern dimension“ of the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy, whose many elements then were incorporated in the respective 
Commission communication 
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inly together with the EU member states (particularly Sweden and Germany), which 
gave them a much better starting position and, in this respect, enabled to infl uence 
the future EU initiatives. 
Motives for the growing interest in Eastern policy in the Czech Republic 
The growing importance of Eastern policy in the Czech foreign policy discour-
se after the EU accession facilitated a more pro-active role of the Czech Republic in 
shaping new EU initiatives targeted at the Eastern neighbourhood of the Union. The 
Czech activity towards Eastern Europe was built on several presumptions on which 
there is a relative consensus among the Czech policy-makers: the need to support 
democratisation and “Europeanization” in the Eastern neighbourhood, and the need 
to pursue economic integration of the Eastern neighbours with the EU. This is for 
example visible in the programme of the centre-right government which took offi  ce 
in January 2007, consisting of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the Christian Demo-
crats (KDU-ČSL) and the Green Party (SZ)6. However, a strong emphasis on democracy 
as a core value which should be projected through Czech foreign policy is quite well-
anchored in the Czech thinking and dates back not only to post-1989 experience but 
as far as the emergence of independent Czechoslovakia in 1918. Institutionally, the 
democratisation eff orts are channelled through a separate department in the foreign 
ministry (currently called Department of Human Rights and Transformation Policy), 
which distributes funds for projects (implemented mainly by NGOs) in a selected 
group of countries. Four out of the priority countries fall under the Eastern partner-
ship – namely Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova. This illustrates that Eastern ne-
ighbourhood is a particularly important area where democratisation eff orts should 
be pursued, not only bilaterally but through diff erent EU policies and instruments. 
The other motive for a resurgent interest in Eastern Europe is explicable by eco-
nomic considerations. Unlike in the 1990’s when, as it was mentioned, the Czech 
companies totally swapped markets and reoriented then on trading with Western 
Europe and other parts of industrialised world, the situation has changed dramati-
cally in mid 2000’s. With the economic growth and increased competition from newly 
industrialising countries, the Czech companies are in a pressing need to look for new 
markets and also, with increasing labour costs in the Czech Republic, in need to in-
vest in lower-cost countries. From this perspective, Eastern Europe seems to be a na-
tural choice for Czech businesses due to the knowledge of local environment, as well 
as overly good reputation of Czech industry and products in the region. In recent 
6 Coalition agreement between ODS, KDU-ČSL and SZ, 2006, p. 30 
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years a boost of trade with Eastern European countries7 became a reality, although 
much of this is attributable to high increase in trade in energies (especially oil and 
gas), approximately 75% of which Czech Republic imports from the region at stake, 
particularly from Russia and Azerbaijan. Due to a very high degree of integration of 
the Czech economy with the EU (about 80% of the Czech trade is with EU countries) 
and the existence of the single EU trade policy, the economic integration of Eastern 
neighbours with the EU seems to be the best way of securing the Czech business 
interests in Eastern Europe through the initiatives taken at the EU level. 
Last but not least, the Czech interest in Eastern Europe was also precipitated by 
the resurgence of Russian infl uence in Eastern Europe. While in 1990’s Russia was 
facing enormous internal problems, and due to this not very much on radar of the 
Czech diplomacy, after the assumption of power by Putin in 2000 the picture chan-
ged substantially and the Czech politicians as well as administration realized that 
the Russian factor in Eastern Europe will once again become an important, if not the 
most important, element determining what the region will look like. 
The role of the Czech Republic in shaping the Eastern Partnership (EaP) 
Let us move on to examining the role of the Czech leadership and diplomacy 
in shaping the Eastern Partnership – the newest initiative framing the relations be-
tween the EU and its Eastern neighbours. Probably the strongest incentives for the 
Czech Republic to take a highly pro-active role in shaping the EU’s relations with East-
ern neighbours were the successive presidencies in the Visegrad Group (2007-2008) 
and subsequently in the European Union (January – June 2009). The preparations 
for the EU presidency started already in 2006, gaining full speed after the parliamen-
tary elections in June 2006. Already in the initial stage there was a consensus in the 
Czech government to put Eastern policy among the top priorities of the presidency 
in the area of external relations. In order to secure a broader support for the Czech 
proposals once leading the EU, the Czechs prepared consultations with its Visegrad 
partners as well as other EU member states considered like-minded (such as Sweden, 
Germany and the Baltic countries) on the enhanced Eastern dimension of European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) through a non-paper8 circulated in 2007. This non-pa-
per was in principle accepted by the V4 which was viewed as a success of the Prague 
7 The trade turnover between the Czech Republic and the EU Eastern Neighbours (including Russia) 
has increased by 63% between 2000 and 2005 on avarage, with some countries, the increase is 
substantailly higher, e.g. with Azerbaijan over 2000%, in case of Moldova and Ukraine by more 
than 100%. Source: Petr Drulák, Elsa Tulmets, Michal Kořan: The Foreign Policy of the Czech Repu-
blic towards the Eastern Neighbourhood. Hungarian Institute of International Relations, p. 3
8 ENP and Eastern Neighbourhood – Time to Act, working document (non-paper) – not public 
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diplomacy, because it provided the basic understanding among the partners and 
thus increased the capacity of the Czech Republic to work on it further to be adopted 
by the EU Council. The basic element of the Czech proposal was to develop a multi-
lateral, project-based Eastern dimension of current ENP through a fl exible framework 
of relations. This would add a multilateral framework to co-operation on concrete 
actions, in addition to existing mainly bilateral framework implemented through 
country specifi c ENP action plans. However, the proposal was still not concrete and 
elaborated enough, and as such it was used by the incoming Polish presidency in 
the Visegrad Group (from June 2008) who, jointly with Sweden, elaborated a more 
detailed proposal for the Eastern dimension of ENP which was tabled to General Af-
fairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) in May 2008 and endorsed as a concept 
under the name of Eastern Partnership in June 2008 European Council conclusions. 
The main diff erence of the Czech and Swedish-Polish proposals was that while the 
Czechs stressed fl exible, less institutionalized approach, the other initiative aimed at 
developing a more formal new framework, similar to another initiative emerging in 
the EU at that time – the Union for the Mediterranean. 
Indeed the Czech Republic has seized a new momentum emerging in a progres-
sive development of European Neighbourhood Policy, where the tensions between 
the southern and eastern dimensions of this policy were becoming ever more obvious 
from 2007 onwards. The European Council conclusions of 14th December 2007 called 
for developing “both the Eastern and the Southern dimensions of ENP in bilateral and 
multilateral formats on the basis of the relevant Commission communications and pro-
posals”. Particularly France became much more active in this respect, not least with the 
view of its incoming presidency which it was to assume in July 2008. The French pro-
posal for the Mediterranean Union was accepted as a concept by the Council in March 
2008, despite some initial controversies particularly between France and Germany, 
where the latter was very much opposed to including only some of the EU countries 
in the project and was concerned about the relation of this new initiative to the exist-
ing community instruments, such as the ENP and the Barcelona process. The French 
proposal aimed very much at the same thing as the later the Polish-Swedish initiative, 
i.e. to provide the southern EU neighbours with new institutional and policy framework 
mainly of a multilateral character. The acceptance of the French proposal at the EU level 
thus made it much easier for the Czech EU presidency which was to follow the French 
one to argue for a balanced approached to the ENP, to push for upgrading the Eastern 
dimension further and to equip the Eastern neighbours with similar set of policies and 
instruments that were intended for the southern Mediterranean states. 
The acceptance of the Polish-Swedish initiative for launching the Eastern Partner-
ship by the European Council in June 2008, returned the ball back to the Commission’s 
court, as the it was charged with preparing the respective communication which was to 
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be issued in 20089. The Commission has invited Poland, Sweden and the Czech Republic, 
as the future Heads of EU presidency to provide an input into this communication. As 
we can see from the contents of the communication, many of the priorities of the Czech 
presidency actually resonate in it which will be analysed in the subsequent section. 
Another impetus that pushed the Czech government to make the Eastern part-
nership one of the top priorities for its EU presidency, was the Russian – Georgian 
confl ict in August 2008. The centre-right government of Prime Minister Mirek Topo-
lánek in power at that time was quite suspicious about the intensions of Russia to-
wards its neighbours and convinced of its long-term goal of undermining the cred-
ibility of Eastern European countries in the eyes of the EU, and of restoring its “sphere 
of infl uence” over the former Soviet republics. The Russian aggression against the 
Georgian territory, although not being viewed consensually on the Czech political 
scene10, was seen as another strong motive that the European Union, if it wants to 
bring the EU neighbours closer to its orbit, must make a much more attractive off er 
to them in addition to what is available for the time being. 
The Eastern Partnership initiatives during the Czech EU presidency
It is interesting to observe how the Eastern partnership was moving up the priori-
ties of the external relations of the Czech EU presidency. Developing the Eastern di-
mension of ENP was on the Czech agenda since the beginning, but rather as some-
thing that the Czech government was obliged to include, because of its geographical 
position and history, previous activities in the Visegrad Group and as a perceived prior-
ity of its foreign policy. Many external factors in the previous section explain why, as the 
presidency was approaching, the Eastern partnership was becoming more important. 
In addition to this, the Czech government was becoming more realistic about what can 
be achieved in other main priority areas of external relations, namely transatlantic rela-
tions and Western Balkans. While in case of EU-US relations the momentum was great 
after the election of President Obama, the very gradual inauguration of the new ad-
ministration in fact limited the scope for any real achievements. Despite organising in 
March 2009, the EU-US summit at the level of heads of government in Prague, Czech-
9 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Eastern Part-
nership, COM(2008) 823 from 3 December 2008, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relati-
ons/eastern/docs/com08_823_en.pdf
10 Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek condemned the Russian aggression against the Georgian territo-
ry, even admitted the posibility of sanctions, pledged assistance worth 150 million CZK to Georgia 
and called for donor conference helping Georgia to cope with reconstruction; on the contrary, 
President Klaus accused Georgian leadership of escalating tensions and provoking Russia. The 
position of foreign minister Karel Schwarzenberg was pro – Georgian but more balanced and in 
line with the French presidency position, favouring dialogue with Russia 
12
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US relations were stranded over many issues including the missile defence and tackling 
of the economic crisis. Similarly in case of Western Balkans, the main goal of unblocking 
the Croatian negotiations was not achieved. This slowly paved the way for the Eastern 
partnership to become the main external priority and a kind of fl agship initiative of the 
Czech presidency, for which it could be remembered and praised. 
Another strong incentive to turn the Eastern partnership into the fl agship initia-
tive of the Czech EU presidency came soon after its start with the gas crisis between 
Ukraine and Russia breaking out in January 2009, which seriously aff ected some of the 
EU member states. Despite the fact that in the very initial stage the Czech Republic 
almost refused to interfere, calling the problem a purely bilateral commercial dispute, 
the active involvement of the top Czech politicians in the upcoming weeks illustrated 
that the understanding of the nature of the dispute inside the Czech administration 
has changed dramatically. According to some people very close to Vice-Premier Alex-
andr Vondra, the main face of the Czech presidency, the whole crisis was viewed as 
a Russian attempt to undermine the credibility of Ukraine as a transit country, and po-
tentially to undermine the festive launch of the Eastern Partnership during the Czech 
term in the head of the EU. It also illustrated that issues concerning energy security are 
going to become a top priority for the Czechs in the context of Eastern partnership. 
The upcoming challenge for the Czech presidency was to have the Eastern Part-
nership endorsed by the European Council, the highest political body in the EU, and 
to prepare the inaugural summit in the spring of 2009, similarly to the summit of the 
Union for the Mediterranean organized under the French presidency in July 2008. 
It took some eff orts, as some member states governments were still hesitant about 
the project. The main points that the Czech diplomacy had to repeatedly underline 
was that the EaP is not anti-Russian, that it is not seeking re-distribution of ENP funds 
in favour of Eastern neighbours, that it is not undermining the existing communi-
ty policies and instruments (especially ENP) and last but not least that it does not 
mean a green light for the six countries concerned to become part of the enlarge-
ment process, i.e. a de facto recognition of their candidate status. Despite the latter, 
the Declaration attached to the Presidency conclusions approved by the March Euro-
pean Council11 states that “work under the Eastern Partnership will go ahead without 
prejudice to individual participating countries’ aspirations for their future relation-
ship with the European Union“. It was also underlined that the Eastern Partnership 
remains on the level of concept, which will be elaborated further but in any case will 
remain under full control of member states, especially when it comes to sensitive is-
sues like visa liberalisation. 
11 Presidency conclusions, Brussels, 29 March 2009 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_
data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/106809.pdf
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The brief evaluation of the inaugural summit which took place in Prague on 7 
May 2009 would be that it was probably not as spectacular as the Czechs hoped for. 
First of all, the Czech government was in resignation already, and the summit was the 
last big showcase before the Prime Minister Topolánek stepped down, but his politi-
cal leverage over the summit has practically vanished. Also the fact that the summit 
was not attended by the major EU leaders, such as Sarkozy, Brown, Berlusconi and 
Zapatero (from the big EU member states only Angela Merkel and Donald Tusk were 
represented) was interpreted by many observers as an illustration of a virtual lack 
of interest in the initiative from the biggest EU players (especially compared to the 
fi rst Mediterranean summit, which was attended by almost all EU leaders). Similarly, 
regarding the partnership countries, Moldovan president Voronin (due to the inter-
nal crisis in Moldova following the parliamentary elections) and Belorussian presi-
dent Lukashenka (for whom the invitation by the foreign ministry was not issued) 
have not attended the summit. But some of the Eastern countries represented at the 
meeting, particularly Ukraine and Georgia, showed disappointment over what the 
Eastern Partnership is off ering them, because they expected more ambitious tasks, 
for instance, the recognition of membership aspirations, visa liberalisation in a short-
term (while it has been set defi nitely as a long-term goal in the March European 
Council conclusions) or inadequacy of fi nances available (600 million € for the period 
until 2013 is considered as too small). Last but not least, the Russian reaction to the 
summit was very hostile, with foreign minister Sergei Lavrov calling the initiative “to-
tally unacceptable” and accusing the EU of trying to extend its “sphere of infl uence” 
through the partnership12. All above mentioned points, clearly illustrate the percep-
tion gap at the time of the launch of the Eastern partnership – diff erent levels of in-
terest among the EU member states, perceived lack of ambition on part of Eastern 
neighbours and a hostile attitude of Russia. The Czech presidency did not manage 
to present the project as an interesting trademark which would be able to foster the 
relations with East European countries on a qualitatively new basis. Only the reality in 
the coming years will show if this new EU initiative can bear fruit for both sides. 
The Eastern Partnership thematic platforms and the Czech EU presidency’s 
priorities – how do they overlap? 
The Czech Republic was active in contributing to the initial Commission proposal 
for the content of Eastern partnership elaborated in the aforementioned Communi-
cation of Dec. 3 2008 and was instrumental in developing them further in the Eastern 
12 Rosie Johnston: Was the the Czech EU Presidency’s Eastern Partnership summit a success? Czech 
Radio, talking point, 12 May 2009, http://www.radio.cz/cz/clanek/116173
14
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Partnership Declaration adopted by the European Council in March 2009. It is thus 
interesting to observe that many of the priorities that the Czech Republic has identi-
fi ed generally for the EU in the framework of its presidency found their way also into 
these documents. 
Firstly, the four platforms of co-operation mentioned in the Communication and 
Presidency conclusions are refl ections either of foreign policy priorities of the Czech 
Republic or the priorities for the presidency. It was already mentioned that support 
of democracy, good governance and stability (the fi rst platform) represents one of 
the cornerstones of Czech foreign policy and that Eastern Europe plays a particular 
role in this area. The Czech Republic already supports many projects targeted at the 
improvement of democratic governance in the four Eastern partnership countries 
(Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Georgia) and as such has already gained a certain 
reputation in the European Union. Developing these further through fi nancial in-
struments available through Eastern Partnership, as well as other community instru-
ments (e.g. EIDHR13) can thus achieve a greater synergy eff ect and can help the Czech 
Republic pursue its own goals vis-à-vis the Eastern countries. 
The same applies to the economic integration of Eastern neighbours with the EU. 
Firstly, this goes in line with the Czech presidency’s idea of open, competitive Europe, 
which involves removal of economic barriers not only inside the European Union but 
also vis-à-vis third countries. The idea of deep and comprehensive free trade agree-
ments (DCFTA) is understood in the Czech administration as one of the best ways 
of achieving economic development, prosperity and stability in Eastern Europe. The 
Czech Republic is a country that has benefi ted immensely from economic liberalisa-
tion in 1990’s and as such can serve as a positive example. Furthermore, the regula-
tory approximation which will be necessary for the establishment of single economic 
space with Eastern neighbours (the Neighbourhood Economic Community) will 
make it easier to adapt to European norms and standards not only economically, but 
also politically. Economic integration with the EU could also make it much easier for 
the countries to integrate in fi nancial terms. Their mutual integration would be ben-
efi cial for regional co-operation, currently underperforming. As so far, the ENP was 
based mainly on bilateral approach without much emphasis on regional co-opera-
tion, this is exactly where the Eastern partnership can make an enormous diff erence. 
Energy security was also one of the top priorities of the Czech EU presidency. It 
achieved mixed results in this respect. On one hand, it successfully engaged in the 
resolution of Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute, pledged further support from member 
states for Nabucco pipeline as well as for improving energy interconnectivity among 
member states. On the other hand, it failed to achieve concrete pledges from Central 
13 EIDHR – European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
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Asian countries (especially Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) to supply gas to Europe 
by alternative routes (including Nabucco). However, the experience of the January/
February gas crisis has demonstrated how much the security of energy supplies de-
pends on the countries in EU’s neighbourhood, particularly Ukraine. Plenty of activi-
ties in this respect, are envisaged in the framework of Eastern Partnership, including 
regulatory harmonisation, early warning mechanism and joint response in cases of 
energy crises, creation of a diversifi ed and interconnected energy market etc. The 
added value of the Eastern partnership from the Czech perspective is again that 
it will be much easier to deal with such issues in multilateral framework, including 
EU and more countries at the time. One issue of concern is to what extent it will be 
achievable without enormous fi nancial investments, which are not available to the 
countries involved and the EU is not ready to make them at the moment, due to lim-
ited resources earmarked for Eastern partnership. 
Finally, the people-to-people contacts also comply with the main motto of the 
Czech presidency – Europe Without Barriers and with the Czech slogan of not only 
providing the free movement of its own citizens, but also of giving the access to the 
EU to third country citizens, neighbours in particular. The Czech Republic was stron-
gly advocating visa liberalisation process with Western Balkan countries, which fi nally 
moved forward with visas being lifted for citizens of Macedonia, Serbia and Monte-
negro in December 2009. Similar approach is supported also in case of the Eastern 
neighbours. With an easier access to the EU, the citizens of the Eastern Partnership 
countries will gradually build a more positive image of the EU – as so far it is much 
easier for them to travel to Russia and EU is viewed as something distant and alien. 
This can greatly help to enhance the eff ectiveness of other EU policies towards the 
region. Although, for the Czech Republic people-to-people contacts are not as im-
portant as for Poland or Hungary because of the absence of minorities, it has wide 
experience with managing migration from the region, particularly from Ukraine. 
However, there is still a discrepancy at the political level – while the foreign minis-
try strongly supports visa liberalisation as a political tool, the interior ministry and 
ministry of labour and social aff airs take a more careful approach. Furthermore, the 
Czechs are aware of the fact that this will be a lengthy and diffi  cult process, not least 
because of the lack of will on part of many member states, the negative eff ects of the 
economic crisis and the fear of uncontrolled migration and organised crime. 
Conclusion
Strong Czech support for the concept of Eastern Partnership, both in the Viseg-
rad Group and once it assumed the EU presidency, clearly demonstrates the rising 
importance of Eastern policy in the Czech foreign policy discourse. The Czech Repub-
16
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lic is clearly in favour of developing the Eastern Dimension of the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy at the EU level. Moreover, the Eastern Partnership provides a new 
platform, which should lead to upgrading the relations and bringing the Eastern 
countries closer to the EU. At the same time, the relevant offi  cials in the Czech For-
eign Ministry see the Eastern Partnership not as something replacing the eventual 
membership perspective of countries in the region, but rather as a waiting room for 
the countries to gain a candidate status and become a part of the enlargement pro-
cess. As the Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek said at the inaugural summit of Eastern 
Partnership,: “This is not supposed to replace or erase a country’s hopes of EU 
membership. This is one of the keystones of the partnership. A country’s as-
pirations to EU membership can run alongside its role as an eastern partner 
of the bloc. The Eastern Partnership allows countries to strengthen their bi-
lateral and multilateral relations with the EU. It gives countries a chance to 
choose their own tempo, their own priorities in the course of this process”14. 
However, realistically currently an explicit promise of membership for East-
ern neighbours cannot be achieved within the EU due to a complete lack of 
consensus within the bloc. Thus in the Czech view it is important to anchor 
the Eastern European states functionally in the EU market and precipitate 
necessary internal reforms in the areas covered by the Eastern Partnership, 
which – once the time is ripe – will make it much easier to put the member-
ship issue again on the table, although many of these countries would like 
to receive such off er already at the time being. 
The content of the Eastern Partnership still needs to be developed, but 
those thematic areas that are mentioned in the relevant documents clear-
ly correlate with Czech interests in the region, as well as with those of the 
Czech presidency in general. Energy security is probably going to be a top 
priority for the Czech Republic in the area of Eastern Partnership, not least 
because of a high dependence of the country on gas and oil coming from 
the region, but also because of the stakes of some major energy companies, 
especially ČEZ15, who is planning a major expansion to the region. Democ-
ratisation and assistance in transformation of the region to European stan-
dards is a long-term goal of the Czech diplomacy and Eastern partnership 
is aimed at helping to enhance the bilateral activities of the Czech Repub-
lic and other, mainly Central European, member states vis-à-vis the region. 
14 Rosie Johnston: Was the the Czech EU Presidency’s Eastern Partnership summit a success? Czech 
Radio, talking point, 12 May 2009, http://www.radio.cz/cz/clanek/116173
15 ČEZ (České energetické závody – Czech Power Comapany) is the 8th biggest producer of electrici-
ty in Europe; the Czech state has a majority stake in its shares (63%)
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Eastern partnership – although carefully portrayed during the Czech EU 
presidency as not anti-Russian – is, however, viewed as a platform to coun-
terbalance the resurgent Russian infl uence particularly in Western-oriented 
countries, among which Ukraine and Georgia are the most important. In the 
Czech view, all the Eastern countries have to be free to choose whether they 
want to integrate with the EU, but the Czech goal is to anchor them fi rmly in 
Europe rather than having a “buff er zone” between Russia and the EU. There 
is some degree of hesitation in the Czech Republic as to whether the whole 
concept would be really attractive enough to achieve the abovementioned 
goals, so it remains to be seen whether once the individual projects and 
fl agship initiatives will be launched, the goal of further “Europeanization” of 
the Eastern Europe will be successful.
18
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The article intends to give a brief summary on the Hungarian perspectives of the 
Eastern Partnership (EaP), and on the expectations, chances and priorities elated to 
the initiative. The author argues that compared to its activities in the Balkans, Hungary 
shows only moderate interest in the Eastern Partnership region, and almost exclusive-
ly only in the Western NIS area, composed of Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova.16Of these 
three, the Republic of Moldova is the most important target area for Hungary; Buda-
pest conducts a wide range of activities here, both in governmental and NGO levels, 
not to mention the EU-framework as a defi nite success area. Concerning policy areas, 
for Hungary clearly the energy security dimension of the EaP is the most important 
one, in connection with the country’s serious dependency on Russian gas supplies and 
Ukrainian transit. Therefore this is the fi eld on which Budapest shows the highest level 
of interest, in addition to it, migration, technical assistance and democracy promotion 
also enjoy high importance. The objectives of the on-going Hungarian Visegrad Presi-
dency are in line with these priorities: most attention is dedicated to the issue of energy 
security, to be enhanced not only in the EaP area, but “intra Visegrad” as well. The im-
portance of the relationship with Russia obviously has an eff ect on the commitment 
and activities of Hungary in the EaP region. This factor is not likely to change signifi can-
tly even after the parliamentary elections, which will take place in April-May 2010.
In order to properly defi ne the role and place of the Eastern Partnership initiative, 
one needs to briefl y analyze also its context, e.g. the general priorities and interests 
of the Hungarian foreign policy, and the perspective of Budapest on the European 
Neighbourhood Policy.
16 The opinion expressed here is only of the author’s own, and no way represents the offi  cial position 
of the ZMNDU Institute of Strategic and Defence Studies. 
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The ENP in the Context of Hungarian Foreign Policy
Following the democratic transition, the foreign policy of Hungary had three 
main priorities. These were: the Euro-Atlantic integration, the good relations with the 
neighbouring countries, and the protection of the interests of the Hungarian mino-
rities living abroad. With the NATO and EU accession, which happened in 1999 and 
2004 respectively, and with the further EU and NATO enlargement taking place in 
2007, these priorities have obviously been changed, together with the general geo-
political environment. As the External Relations Strategy puts it, the three priorities of 
the current Hungarian foreign policy are: 1. a competitive Hungary in the European 
Union, which is about realizing the political, economic and social interests of Hunga-
ry in the framework of the EU. About this part, the website of the Ministry of Foreign 
Aff airs declares: “We regard strengthening the eastern dimension of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy as an important objective, and we regard Ukraine and Moldo-
va as special partners in doing so”, besides stating that the Euro-Atlantic integration 
of the neighbouring states, namely of Croatia, Serbia and Ukraine are key Hungarian 
interests.17 2. Successful Hungarians in the region, which point is again declaring the 
responsibility felt for the minorities living abroad, for the protection of their rights 
and interests in order to ensure their welfare and well-being in their home countries. 
3. A responsible Hungary in the world, which enumerates the international commit-
ments of Hungary.18 The strategy uses clear wording regarding the role of the EU in 
the Hungarian foreign policy: “The European Union is the most important framework 
for Hungarian foreign policy and action”19
Concerning security policy, the National Security Strategy, adopted in 2004 pro-
motes the central role of NATO in guaranteeing the security and defence of Hungary. 
Besides many others, the strategy mentions among the security primary security ob-
jectives “the general prevalence of democratic values, including their spreading bey-
ond the Euro-Atlantic region.”20 The long term stability of Ukraine and Russia is also 
declared being a strategic priority.
17 http://www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/kum/en/bal/foreign_policy/hungary_in_the_world/ Last ac-
cessed: 9 Dec 2009.
18 Magyarország Külkapcsolati Stratégiája [Hungary’s External Relations Strategy.] Available: http://
www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/hu/bal/Kulpolitikank/kulkapcsolati_strategia/hu_kulkapcs_strat.
htm Last accessed: 2 Dec 2009.
19 ibid. 
20 The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary. Available: http://www.mfa.gov.hu/NR/
rdonlyres/61FB6933-AE67-47F8-BDD3-ECB1D9ADA7A1/0/national_security_strategy.
pdf Last accessed: 2 Dec 2009. p.2.
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The foreign policy of Hungary has traditionally two main geographical areas of 
interests, due to geopolitical, historical, economic and cultural reasons. These two 
are the Western-Balkans and Eastern-Europe. Of course, in connection with the UN, 
NATO and OSCE membership, Budapest is ready to get engaged in geographically 
remote areas as well, mostly in the fi eld of crisis management and development po-
licy: Hungarian forces took part in the Coalition operation in Iraq; Hungary operates 
a PRT in Afghanistan, etc. However, the two main areas, where Budapest is able to 
act not only in alliances, but also on its own are the above mentioned two ones: the 
Western-Balkans and countries of the former Soviet Union. As the Western-Balkans 
is not part of the ENP at all, this study is going to focus on the issues and interests 
related to Eastern-Europe.
ENP from a Hungarian Perspective
Since its EU accession, Hungary has been actively participating in the Europe-
an Neighbourhood Policy. Due to the location of the country, Budapest pays more 
attention to the Eastern dimension of the ENP than to the Mediterranean relations. 
Generally speaking, the interests and objectives of Hungary are in line with the ones 
of the EU – promotion of stability and democratic values in the neighbourhood, sup-
port for market economy-oriented reforms, etc. – however, there are a few specifi c 
policy areas, which are of special importance for Budapest, concerning the neighbo-
urhood policy towards Eastern Europe.
The fi rst one is the question of Hungarian minorities living abroad, in the parti-
cular case of the EU Neighbourhood Policy, in Ukraine. The situation of the approxi-
mately 150.000 Hungarians living in Ukraine is far from being ideal, especially con-
cerning their right to use their native language in education and cultural life. These 
problems are related to the generally restrictive policy of Ukraine towards ethnic 
minorities, which is mostly connected to the Russian minority living there. Anyways, 
Budapest keeps the representation and the protection of the Hungarian minorities 
living in Ukraine constantly on the agenda.
Following the same primary objective of protecting the minorities abroad, Hungary 
promotes cross-border cooperation with all neighbouring states. This is perceived as 
a tool for improving the standards of living in those regions, where most minority Hun-
garians live. Concerning Ukraine, there are numerous small and medium-sized projects 
realized in the poor Zakarpatya region in the framework of cross-border initiatives. Besi-
des, of course, successful cross-border projects help improving the economic situation 
of the underdeveloped North-Eastern counties of Hungary as well. 
The second issue of special Hungarian interest in the general EU foreign policy 
towards Eastern Europe is energy security, more concretely the serious dependency 
22
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of Hungary on Russian gas supplies. The situation can be described as “triple vulne-
rability”: 1.Budapest has no alternative source of gas supplies, only Russia. 2. There is 
only one transit route available: Ukraine. 3. Hungary itself is not a transit country, thus 
Budapest has no bargaining position in this aspect. 
In addition to all these, natural gas has a very high share, approx. 45% in the pri-
mary energy balance of Hungary, 85% of which is procured from abroad, namely 
from Russia. This extraordinarily high dependency on Russian gas defi nes the Hunga-
rian behavior in the Nabucco vs. South Stream debate as well. As the primary interest 
of Hungary is to decrease this “triple vulnerability”, and as currently no one can tell, 
which project will be realized earlier (or, which project will be realized at all), Hungary 
cannot aff ord to exclusively commit itself to any of them – the only choice left is to 
support the realization of both projects.21
This leads to a third factor, which also needs to be briefl y analyzed, namely the 
role and position of Russia in the foreign and security policy of Hungary. Regarding 
the Russian factor, the Hungarian situation is not unique at all in the EU (unlike the 
minority question, for example); however, it still needs to be taken into account. First, 
energy dependency consists not only of dependency on natural gas, but also on Rus-
sian crude oil, and on Russian uranium necessary for operating the Pakistani nuclear 
power plant. Second, the role of Russia as a trading partner cannot be ignored. Ac-
cording to recent data from the Ministry for National Development and Economy, 
Russian Federation is far the largest non-EU foreign trade partner of Hungary, taking 
a share of 3,5% of total exports, and 6,6% of all imports, where the total 100% is cal-
culated together with the EU-markets.22
The Eastern Partnership and Hungarian Interests…
The Hungarian government has actively participated in the elaboration of the 
Eastern Partnership concept. During drafting phase of the EaP, Hungary strongly sup-
ported the inclusion of Belarus, in order to encourage the already visible, pro-Euro-
pean changes in the attitude of the regime, and to support the reforms. For a long 
time Budapest has been openly against any eff orts to isolate Belarus and has been 
in favour of establishing as many ties as possible, without violating the U.S. and EU 
sanctions being that time in place. This policy was well-demonstrated by the ope-
ning of the Hungarian embassy in Minsk in December 2007, though the decision was 
21 Sz. Bíró, Zoltán: A Déli Áramlat és a Nabucco [The South Stream and Nabucco]. In: Nemzet és Biz-
tonság [Nation and Security], April 2008. pp. 23-29. 
22 Source: Külkereskedelmi forgalmunk fontosabb EU-n kívüli partnereinkkel, I-IX. 2009. [Foreign trade 
with the main non-EU partners, January-September 2009.] Available: http://www.nfgm.gov.hu/
data/cms1950906/eun_kivul_orszag.xls Last accessed: 18 Dec 2009.
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criticized some of the Western partners. Besides the above-mentioned political inten-
tions, economic motivations also had a role to play: to support and improve bilateral 
trade, to encourage Belarusian tourists visiting Hungary, etc.23
Budapest has warmly welcomed the offi  cial launch of the initiative in May 2009. 
Following the ceremony, Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai has pointed out: “the Partner-
ship is especially important for Hungary and the EU because it improves energy securi-
ty.” Bajnai stressed the importance of having alternative sources of gas and alternative 
transit lines, and reminded the journalists that the building of the Nabucco pipeline is 
the priority for Hungary, together with the creation of a common EU energy policy.24
The geographical priority for Hungary in the Eastern Partnership is clearly the We-
stern-NIS region, thus the trio formed by Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. The three 
countries of the South Caucasus are far away, Hungary has practically no historical, 
cultural ties with them, and economic and political contacts are also very limited.25 In 
the South Caucasus region Budapest in most cases acts only as a policy taker, while in 
Eastern Europe a defi nite policy maker role is ambitioned, at least in some particular 
issues, to be discussed below. 
The already discussed Russian factor obviously has an eff ect on the Hungarian 
approach to the Eastern Partnership as well. Hungary is not interested in alienating 
Russia in any ways. On the contrary, Budapest intends to maintain stable, pragmatic 
political relations with Russia, in the framework of the dialog conducted by the EU 
and NATO, and “on the basis of bilateral economic interests.”26 
Energy security 
Energy security is defi nitely the most important element of the EaP initiative. 
Especially because the proposal envisages not only the security of supplies and 
transit, but deals with questions of regulations and ways of using renewables, which 
23 For a more detailed list of motivations, see: Legyen vagy ne legyen magyar nagykövetség Minszkben? 
[Should There Be or Should Not Be a Hungarian Embassy in Minsk?] In: Népszabadság, 25 Sept 
2007. Available: http://www.nol.hu/archivum/archiv-465308 Last accessed: 8 Dec 2009.
24 EU Keleti Partnerség Moszkva küszöbén. [EU Eastern Partnership in the Doorstep of Moscow] Avail-
able: http://www.euractiv.hu/kulpolitika/hirek/eu-keleti-partnerseg-moszkva-kuszo-
ben-001651 Last accessed: 8 Dec 2009.
25 Hungary does not even have an embassy in all three countries of the region, only in Tbilisi and in 
Baku. However, the small Tbilisi embassy currently cannot issue visas, thus visas to Hungary are 
given by the Latvian embassy. For more information see: http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/en/bal/
missions/missions_abroad/embassies_consulates/europe.htm Last accessed: 10 Dec 2009.
26 Magyarország Külkapcsolati Stratégiája [Hungary’s External Relations Strategy.] Available: http://
www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/hu/bal/Kulpolitikank/kulkapcsolati_strategia/hu_kulkapcs_strat.
htm Last accessed: 2 Dec 2009.
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is also a source of diversifi cation. The EaP might be another way for Hungary for de-
creasing the above mentioned “triple vulnerability”, and to diversify its energy sup-
plies. The initiative, tacitly favouring Nabucco is in line with the respective Hungarian 
approach: the government has appointed a special Nabucco Ambassador and orga-
nized a huge conference on the pipeline project in Budapest on 26-27 January 2009, 
just after the Ukrainian gas crisis.
However, one has to add that side by side with this pro-Nabucco approach, on 10 
March 2009 János Erős, Chairman of the Hungarian Development Bank and Alexey 
Miller, CEO of the Gazprom have signed the contract on establishing the joint com-
pany, which would conduct the construction works of the Hungarian part of the So-
uth Stream gas pipeline. The Hungarian and Russian sides, represented by the MOL 
and the Gazprom have also agreed on jointly building an underground gas storage 
facility in the Pusztaföldvár-Dús area with a capacity of 1,3 bcm. The signature ce-
remony was attended both by Vladimir Putin and Ferenc Gyurcsány. Following the 
event, Gyurcsány told the press that the more pipeline a country has, the better its 
energy security becomes. He added that according to the decision of the Hungarian 
Parliament, Nabucco enjoys priority.27
Some politicians and analysts argued that the earlier, rather balancing approach 
was radically changed by the January 2009 gas crisis, and as a result Hungary has 
become clearly committed to the Nabucco project. However, in reality, as demon-
strated above, this is only partially true: Hungary has become even more determined 
to diversifi cation, both of the supplies and of the transit routes. Nabucco, if realized, 
would clearly be the best option, however, the South Stream must also not be exclu-
ded, and especially as currently only the latter’s gas supply seems to be guaranteed.28
In addition to that, Budapest puts signifi cant eff orts and resources in construc-
ting gas storage facilities on Hungarian soil, in order to ensure the country’s energy 
security. The Szőreg-1 facility near Algyő, completed 1 October 2009, is capable of 
storing 1,2 bcm gas, which – together with the domestic production – is enough for 
45 days, even in case of a total import disruption. 
Promotion of democratic values and technical assistance
One of the main principles of the Eastern Partnership is to strengthen the rule of 
law, democracy and respect for human right in the Eastern neighbourhood. Besides, 
27 Gyurcsány aláírta a Déli Áramlat építését. [Gyurcsány Has Signed the Construction of the South 
Stream] www.index.hu 10 March 2009. http://index.hu/gazdasag/magyar/2009/03/10/gy-
urcsany_alairta_a_deli_aramlat_epiteset/ 
28 For more information on the lack of ensured gas supplies, see: Sz.Bíró, ibid.
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the initiative also mentions providing technical assistance to the partner countries, 
and support their legal approximation to the EU regulatory environment. Develop-
ment of Comprehensive Institution-Building Programmes is concretely proposed.29 In 
the case of Hungary these two fi elds are closely linked to each other.
The External Relations Strategy openly declares that that Hungary intends “to ac-
tively support the broad respect for democratic values” and “to support democratic 
development”.30 However, as Áron Horváth points it out in his paper on Hungary’s 
democracy assistance policy,31 a clear strategy defi ning the objectives, priority areas, 
options and ways of democracy assistance is still missing. Though the government 
intends to coordinate democracy-related activities with international development 
cooperation, yet not much concrete is visible of it. There is no separate budget for de-
mocracy assistance programs; the MFA handles it together with development coope-
ration funds, and the management of these funds is not very transparent. Besides, 
Budapest prefers to implement democracy assistance projects with the consent of 
the hosting government, thus priority is given to work conducted in safe, suppor-
tive environment. Though the Hungarian NGO International Centre for Democratic 
Transition has a few activities, which are less cooperative (NGO capacity building in 
Belarus, etc.), most of their projects still follow the usual line of avoiding any con-
frontation with the governments of the targeted region (concerning the Eastern Part-
nership region, such projects are about training security policy experts in Moldova, 
organizing workshop on confi dence building in Ukraine, etc.)32 Another particularity 
of the ICDT is that it operates with receiving signifi cant annual support from the MFA 
budget – in other words, in many aspects the MFA uses the ICDT as a tool for interna-
tional democracy assistance. 
The geographical focus of international development cooperation (including de-
mocracy assistance) conducted by the Hungarian government is oriented mostly to-
wards the Balkans. As the offi  cial MFA document33 describes, the medium-term part-
ner countries are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Palestinian Authority, Serbia and 
29 EaP p.7.
30 Magyarország Külkapcsolati Stratégiája [Hungary’s External Relations Strategy.] Available: http://
www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/hu/bal/Kulpolitikank/kulkapcsolati_strategia/hu_kulkapcs_strat.
htm Last accessed: 2 Dec 2009. 
31 Horváth, Áron: Hungarian Minorities, the Balkans... and the Far East. Hungary’s Democracy Assistance 
Policies and Priorities. In: Kucharczyk, Jacek – Lowitt, Jeff  (eds.) Democracy’s New Champions. Euro-
pean democracy assistance after EU enlargement. PASOS, 2008. pp. 51-80. 
32 For more information, see the offi  cial webpage of the ICDT: www.icdt.hu Last accesed: 11 Dec 
2009. 
33 Tasks for 2008 in terms of Hungarian Development Policy. Available: http://www.kulugyminisz-
terium.hu/NR/rdonlyres/06C1F916-0339-49F5-8903-85B444D9295D/0/1_2008nefeKB1h
atEN.pdf Last accessed: 11 Dec 2009.
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Vietnam. In addition to them, project-based cooperation is going on with countries 
of the Sub-Saharan Africa, Cambodia, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Macedonia, Mongo-
lia, Montenegro, Ukraine and Yemen. From these two lists, the prioritized place of the 
Western-Balkans is clear: all countries of the region are listed (except Albania), while 
from the Eastern Partnership area only two states are mentioned, with Moldova be-
ing a strategic and Ukraine being a project-based partner.
Concerning the policy focus, Hungary intends to share experiences of the politi-
cal-economic transition, and prefers to get engaged in capacity-building, knowled-
ge-transfer, institution-building, transfer of organizational and planning methods, 
etc. Further areas of technical development activity are the support of education, 
agriculture and water management.34 
Migration and free movement of people
Due to the sensitivity of the question of Hungarian minorities living abroad, Bu-
dapest has been traditionally advocating the liberalization of visa regimes, the free 
movement of people, the simplifi cation of procedures, etc. The motivation is obvio-
us: through such a policy Hungary intends to support the Hungarians living in the 
neighbouring non-EU, or non-Schengen countries, in order to maintain and streng-
then their cultural and private ties with the mother nation. In the early nineties this 
was far from being obvious, and even with the EU-accession of Slovenia, Slovakia and 
Romania, the exclusion of the latter two from the Schengen zone is still a source of 
problems. The situation of the Hungarians living in Serbia has recently improved a lot 
with the adoption of the visa-free regime in December 2009. However, the case of 
Ukraine is still a complicated one.
Another element of why the issue of migration and free movement of people have 
long been on the agenda is that Hungary is historically in the crossroad of migration 
fl ows. Temporary labour immigration from the neighbouring countries has contributed 
a lot to the Hungarian agricultural sector, and the country was also a target for huge 
numbers of refugees from the Yugoslav civil war, from the Middle-East, most recently 
from Afghanistan, not to mention the increasing number of people arriving from Sub-
Saharan African countries. Hungary, being on the South-East fl ank of the Schengen 
zone is also a primary transit country for illegal migrant travelling to the West.
These factors altogether justify, why the issue of migration, border security, bor-
der management and the visa question have always been on the Hungarian agenda. 
34 The document describing the policy priorities was made in 2006, but it is still valid: A Brief Summa-
ry of Hungary’s International Development Co-operation Activities. Available: http://www.mfa.gov.
hu/NR/rdonlyres/6C909959-3C4A-4881-9096-9C8F368B4748/0/061206_ODA_HU.pdf 
Last accessed: 20 Dec 2009.
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Therefore this aspect of the Eastern Partnership, supporting the mobility of citizens 
of the partner countries though visa facilitation35 enjoys wide professional support. 
Particularly because the elaboration of a common, global immigration policy, descri-
bed in the Global Approach to Migration is in the essential interest of Hungary.
Focus on Ukraine and Moldova
As mentioned above, the stability, democratic development and Euro-Atlantic 
approximation of Ukraine is declared to be a priority in the key Hungarian foreign 
and security policy documents. In 2003 the so-called “Nyíregyháza Initiative” was 
launched by the MFA in order to actively support the reform processes in Ukraine, 
but in reality not much visible is being done concerning Ukraine as a whole. Most 
attention and resources dedicated to the Zakarpatya region: capacity-building, edu-
cational programs, support for small and medium enterprises, etc. The visibility of the 
Nyíregyháza Initiative36 is hampered by the fact that the activities conducted in its 
framework are done by an NGO, Euro-Clip Public Foundation. The actual Hungarian 
priorities regarding Ukraine were clearly visible during the latest visit of Péter Balázs, 
Minister of Foreign Aff airs to Ukraine on 22-23 Dec 2009: security of energy transit 
and educational rights of the Hungarian minorities.37
The Republic of Moldova is the only country in the Eastern Partnership region, whe-
re Hungary ambitions a real policy-making role. Budapest holds important individual 
EU-positions related to Moldova: not only the EU Special Representative is Hungarian, 
but the EU Border Assistance Mission is also led by a Hungarian police general, Ferenc 
Banfi . In the framework of a TAIEX Programme, an advisor from the Hungarian Parlia-
ment is working near the Moldovan Parliament and very successful Common Appli-
cation Center is operating in the Hungarian embassy in Chisinau, where Moldovan ci-
tizens can obtain visas to numerous EU countries, which do not maintain a diplomatic 
representation in Chisinau. Moldova is a stable, medium-term partner in international 
development cooperation, and intensive, high-level contacts are maintained between 
the two governments. Interestingly enough, not only the government, but also the op-
35 EaP, p.7.
36 Taking into account that it has no own website, and Google gives only 176 hits to the 
search word “Nyíregyháza Initiative”, one might be tempted to question the real interna-
tional importance of the initiative. The Hungarian version, “Nyíregyházi Kezdeményezés” 
generates altogether 493 hits. Test conducted: 23 Dec 2009.
37 The offi  cial MFA communique about the meeting: Előrelépés a kárpátaljai magyar iskolák tanköny-
vellátásának ügyében – a külügyminiszter kijevi tárgyalásai. [A Step Forward in the Issue of Textbook 
Supplies to the Hungarian Schools in Transcarpathia – Negotiations of the Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs in Kyiv.] Available: http://www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/kum/hu/bal/Aktualis/Szovivoi_
nyilatkozatok/BP_Kijev_091223.htm Last accessed: 25 Dec 2009.
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position pays attention to maintain good contacts with Moldova: recently Viktor Orban, 
Chairman of Fidesz, the strongest opposition party has met Moldovan Prime Minister 
Vlad Filat, and declared that if Fidesz wins the next parliamentary elections, strategic 
partnership “in all fi elds” will be established with Moldova.38 
...in Context of the V4 Presidency 
Hungary holds the presidency of the V4 from July 2009 to June 2010. From the 
four priorities listed on the introductory website of the Hungarian V4 presidency39, two 
includes the Eastern Partnership, the fi rst one refers to the need of V4 cooperation in 
Eastern Europe, and the fourth one speaks about “democracy building in our neighbo-
urhood.” The full version of the presidency program is, of course, much more defi nite. 
It declares that the realization of the Eastern Partnership is one of the main priorities 
of the Hungarian presidency, both in bilateral and multilateral format. It emphasizes 
the need of active engagement, though with using a pragmatic approach. This prag-
matism characterizes the whole presidency program. Emphasis is put on the need of 
strengthening the ties between the European Commission and the Eastern partners, 
and also between the countries exercising the EU presidency and the Eastern part-
ners.40 This refl ects to the fact that Hungary is well aware of the limitations of her size, 
economic and political power, if compared either to the Eastern Partnership region or 
to the EU in general. Among such circumstances, obviously multilateralism and prag-
matism is the most viable strategy for a small state to realize its own interests.
The wording of the program demonstrates that Hungary envisions the Visegrad 
cooperation and its role in Eastern Europe not as a sole entity, not as an actor wor-
king only on its own, but as part of a greater community of actors, namely of the 
European Union. With other words, the Hungarian V4 presidency strategy properly 
realizes that the V4 cooperation has the best chance to become a strong player in 
Eastern Europe, if it manages to direct and maintain the attention (and the resources) 
of the EU as a whole to the Eastern Partnership region. This is also fully in line with 
the already mentioned statement of the External Relations Strategy: “The European 
Union is the most important framework for Hungarian foreign policy and action.”
38 For more information see: Összefoglaló Orbán Viktor bonni tárgyalásairól [Summary the Bonn Ne-
gotiations of Viktor Orbán] Available: http://www.fi desz.hu/index.php?Cikk=143061 Last ac-
cessed: 11 Dec 2009. 
39 2009/2010 Hungarian presidency. Introduction. Available: http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.
php?folderID=942&articleID=23256&ctag=articlelist&iid=1 Last accessed: 8 Dec 2009. 
40 A Visegrádi Csoport magyar elnökségének programja. [Program of the Hungarian Presi-
dency of the Visegrad Group]. Available: http://www.visegradgroup.eu/download.
php?ctag=download&docID=127 Last accessed: 8 Dec 2009. p.6.
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Geographic priority on the East is the West
The analysis of the Hungarian V4 presidency program is quite telling about the geo-
graphical priorities of Hungary concerning the Eastern Partnership region. For Buda-
pest the three Western countries of the six Eastern partners are clearly of much higher 
importance than the three countries of the South-Caucasus. In the External Relations 
Strategy only one country is mentioned of the Eastern Partnership region, Ukraine. The 
V4 presidency program speaks in a detailed way about the three Western-NIS neigh-
bours, however, of the three South Caucasus states Georgia is mentioned only twice in 
the text, while Azerbaijan and Armenia are completely left out. This is in line with the 
overall interests and resources of the Hungarian foreign and security policy, for which 
the South-Caucasus region, as stated earlier, is defi nitely not among the priorities. 
Contrary to this, the presidency program devotes separate chapters to the coope-
ration with Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, and there is also a fourth one, dedicated 
to Russia. Of course, as the presidency program is to be approved by all V4 countries, 
it does refl ect mainly the joint V4 priorities, while national ones are represented only 
to a limited extent. 
V4 + Belarus
About Belarus the intensifi cation of cooperation enjoys the support of the presi-
dency, provided the suspended conditions are met. Dialogue should be strengthe-
ned mostly in technical matters: tourism, consular issues, energy security, environ-
mental protection, etc. 
V4 + Ukraine
The ambitions are probably the highest about Ukraine. The program attaches 
great importance to maintain dialogue with Ukraine in order get the country closer 
to the European standards and practices. Cooperation is envisioned in many fi elds, 
including good governance, energy security, border control, mobility, visa issues, pe-
ople to people contacts, etc. 
V4 + Moldova
About Moldova the presidency program uses a rather laconic wording: streng-
thening the rule of law, democracy and fundamental human rights is of essential im-
portance. In addition, the V4 should provide political and technical support to Mol-
dova, mainly in the fi eld of administrative capacity building.
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V4 + Russia
Concerning the relation with Russia, the presidency expects the improvement of 
the EU-Russia relations. The key element of the program is that in the post-PCA si-
tuation the V4 would approve a new, comprehensive EU-Russia agreement, which 
would contain detailed, legally binding elements in the fi eld of energy security.
Policy-oriented priorities related to the EaP
If one intends to map out the concrete policy-related priorities of the Hungarian 
V4 presidency, the results are mostly in accord with the national priorities analyzed 
before, though, of course, with the adequate “Visegrad” characteristics of the pro-
gram. The Hungarian presidency intends to organize a large-scale Eastern Partner-
ship conference and meeting of foreign ministers in Budapest in spring 2010. This 
event will be the focus point of the actual Hungarian activities directed towards 
Eastern Europe, both in the wider framework of the EU, and in the Visegrad coopera-
tion. The spring event will follow the trends set by the Western-Balkans conference, 
which took place in November 2009. 
Energy policy
The program devotes more than one page to the question of energy security. The 
initiatives proposed are in line with the EaP, and in certain areas they go even further. 
The program ambitions to foster cooperation in order to get the region’s energy se-
curity interests included into the EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan: 2nd 
Strategic Energy Review. In general, great attention is paid to ensure cooperation 
between the Visegrad states in order to reach their joint objectives on various EU 
forums dealing with energy. Besides, the construction of Central-European intercon-
nectors is strongly supported, which is in accord with the diversifi cation objectives of 
the EaP. The program argues that the Visegrad countries should support the inclusion 
of Moldova and Ukraine to the energy-related acquis communautaire, in order to en-
sure stability and transparency in energy business in the whole region. New element 
is the proposal to build Central-European gas storage facilities in joint venture of the 
V4 countries. Similar cooperation is encouraged between national electricity markets. 
Migration and free movement of people
Along with the EaP, the presidency program also refers to the EU Global Appro-
ach to Migration. Hungary intends to continue the Czech initiative of establishing 
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migration partnership with the eastern and south-eastern neighbours. The program 
proposes migration data exchange on migration tendencies between the Visegrad 
countries, concerning particularly the migration originating from Asia. 
Technical assistance in administrative capacity building
The program attaches particular importance in assisting the eastern neighbours 
in capacity building and in improving the performance of the national administra-
tions. The fostering of cross-border cooperation belongs here too, due to its mostly 
technical nature. Though the EaP itself was not too concrete on these issues, the re-
cently adopted Vademecum on Financing document openly declares that national 
administrations will profi t the most from the Eastern Partnership.41 This approach 
seems being rather similar to the one of the Hungarian government, e.g. that de-
velopment cooperation and capacity building assistance should be aimed mostly 
at governmental structures, and only to a limited extent at the civil society and the 
NGO sector.
An Additional Way to Reach Objectives: Visegrad Cooperation in EU 
Presidencies
The above analyzed Hungarian V4 presidency program mentions that in 36 mon-
ths, three of the four Visegrad countries exercise the EU presidency: the fi rst one was 
the Czech Republic in the fi rst half of 2009; the second will be Hungary from Janu-
ary to June 2011, and the third one Poland, taking the position right after Hungary. 
The document envisions that Budapest is going to have a bridging role between the 
Czech and Polish presidencies. In fact, not much is visible of this bridge-like role, if 
one puts aside the existence of the Eastern Partnership initiative in general, which 
was adopted during the Czech presidency, and some migration-relate initiatives. Ho-
wever, the direct succession of the Hungarian and Polish presidencies in 2011 off er 
real chances of meaningful cooperation, in many foreign policy issues related to the 
Eastern Partnership region. The argument is used also by high-ranking offi  cials from 
the MFA, for example Gábor Iván, State Secretary for European Union Aff airs.42
41 Vademecum on Financing in the Frame of the Eastern Partnership. 16 Dec 2009. Available: http://
ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eastern/docs/eap_vademecum_14122009_en.pdf Last 
accessed: 21 Dec 2009.
42 Iván, Gábor: Stratégiai irányok a spanyol-belga-magyar elnökség programjában és a trió együtt-
működésének más területein. [Strategic Directions in the Spanish-Belgian-Hungarian Presidency 
Program, and in Other Fields of Cooperation of the Trio.] In: Európai Tükör [European Mirror.] 
2008/11. pp. 84-91.
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Without attempting to create a full list, it is worth to enumerate some of the fac-
tors, which might pose foreign policy-related challenges in Eastern Europe in 2011:
 Presidential elections in Belarus in Spring 2011 
 Possible Azerbaijan-Armenia confl ict over Nagorno-Karabakh
 Growing instability in Russian North-Caucasus
 On-going domestic political and economic crisis in Ukraine
 New possible “energy wars” between Russia and its neighbours, aff ecting also the 
EU
From the above-listed fi ve, the presidential elections in Belarus will surely take 
place, so starting to prepare for the coming crisis would be high time. As Hungary, 
which will exercise the presidency right that time, has neither the resources, nor the 
fi eld knowledge, nor the contacts for extensively working with non-state actors in 
Belarus, there would be a clear room for close cooperation with Poland (both bila-
terally and in the framework of the EU), enabling Warsaw to directly continue joint 
initiatives started by Budapest, etc. Such cooperation would also be suitable for 
strengthening the role of the Visegrad cooperation in Belarus. Some experts say that 
there are already some informally cooperation initiatives going on between parties 
of the Polish political right and of the Fidesz in Hungary, however, these are not yet 
fi nalized. 
In addition to the possible crises listed above, there are some technical, admi-
nistrative matters related to the EU – Eastern neighbourhood relationship, in which 
close coordination would be necessary among the Visegrad states, in order to streng-
then the role of the V4 in the EU. Some of these issues are:
 Preparing the EU External Action Service for reaching the operational status to 
2012, as prescribed in the Treaty of Lisbon. 
 All the EU-Ukraine, EU-Moldova and the EU-Georgia Action Plan expire in the end 
of 2011, thus preparation of the new Action Plans will fall mostly to 2011.
These are also such issues, in which the general interests of the V4 states are cle-
arly overlapping, thus close and coordinated Visegrad cooperation on various EU fo-
rums could be of good use.
Domestic policy considerations
All the above mentioned external factors together constitute the context, in 
which the Eastern Partnership can be interpreted from the Hungarian perspective. 
However, in addition to the already enumerated ones, domestic political environ-
ment also has a role to play. First, no one can ignore the global fi nancial crisis, which 
has badly impacted Hungary. The situation was further worsened by the domestic 
economic crisis, altogether resulting in an approx. 6-7% of GDP decrease, growing 
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unemployment, etc. This obviously had its eff ect on foreign policy as well, the bud-
get of the MFA has been signifi cantly cut, a number of embassies and consulates 
have been closed, etc.
Second, the battle of words between the government and opposition parties has 
become much more intense, as the parliamentary elections of April-May 2010 are ap-
proaching. In the fi eld of foreign policy, the debates are not much about EU policies 
in general, but on certain foreign policy-related issues, in which the government and 
opposition parties have remarkably diff erent standpoints. The two most important 
ones are the protection of the Hungarian minorities living abroad, and the relations 
with Russia. On both topics there are widespread, open debates between the go-
vernment and opposition, while united stand is visible only in times of serious crises 
(gas supply disruption in January 2009, the recent law on language use in Slovakia, 
regulation on minority language education in Ukraine, etc.).
The question of Hungarian minorities living abroad is only partially related to the 
Eastern Partnership. The Eastern dimension of the question is mostly a bilateral Hun-
garian-Ukrainian issue, in which Budapest intends to use various international forums 
as well, if necessary. The relationship to Russia is a more interesting and complex pro-
blem. While the ruling Socialist Part government of Gordon Bajnai, and especially of 
his predecessor’s, Ferenc Gyurcsány’s maintained remarkably close ties with Russia, 
the strongest opposition party, Fidesz has constantly kept criticizing the government 
of “opening the doors for Russian infi ltration”, “selling the country to Russia”, etc.43 
Concerning energy policy, Fidesz has been strongly pro-Nabucco, while the So-
cialist governments have pursued the already described pragmatic, dual policy, sup-
porting (at least tacitly) both the South Stream and Nabucco projects. However, as 
probably Fidesz will win the April-May 2010 parliamentary elections, a signifi cant 
change has already become visible in the Russia-policy of the party. In late Novem-
ber Viktor Orbán, Chairman of the Fidesz was invited to St. Petersburg to the con-
gress of the “United Russia” party, where he negotiated with Vladimir Putin.44 Fidesz 
communicated the meeting as a great success story, and in the domestic media 
Orban kept stressing the importance of the good relations with Russia. Seemingly 
Fidesz is already preparing for governmental work, and the sudden change of tone 
represents the takeover of pragmatist considerations over the earlier populism. If this 
43 For example see the interview of Polish Weekly ’Wprost’ with Viktor Orban: Zazdroszczę Polsce. 
Rozmowa z Viktorem Orbánem, byłym premierem Węgier. In: Wprost, 43/2008. Available: 
http://www.wprost.pl/ar/141904/Zazdroszcze-Polsce/?I=1348 Last accessed: 4 Dec 2009. 
44 Számunkra normális, hogy Orbán és Putyin találkozik. [For Us it is Normal that Orban and Putin 
Meet]. Interview with Russian Ambassador to Budapest, H.E. Alexandr Tolkach. In: Népszabadság, 
12 Dec 2009. Available: http://www.nol.hu/kulfold/20091212-ne_feljenek_moszkvatol Last 
accessed: 13 Dec 2009.
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new, less assertive and more cooperation-oriented Russia-policy of Fidesz will last, no 
signifi cant change is probable in the Hungarian approach to the Eastern Partnership.
Due to the coming elections attention will mostly be diverted from the last mon-
ths of the Hungarian V4 Presidency. It is yet unknown, to what extent the subsequent 
personal and organizational changes in the administrative structures will aff ect the 
effi  cacy and functioning of the governmental structures responsible for foreign poli-
cy making. Most experts and analysts agree that the change in power will not result 
in an earthquake-scenario simply due to the approaching EU Presidency;45 however, 
a defi nite change of tones might well be expected. Anyways, if the mentioned lar-
ge Eastern Partnership conference will be successfully organized and conducted in 
spring 2010, it will surely be a signifi cant step forward, not only concerning the Hun-
garian interests, awareness and level of knowledge on the Eastern Partnership, but 
also for the whole Visegrad region. 
En lieu of a Conclusion
The neighbourhood policy of Hungary is mostly oriented towards the Western-
Balkans, while the eastern neighbourhood enjoys only moderate attention. Concer-
ning the Eastern Partnership region, the Hungarian approach is characterized by its 
pragmatic, non-ideological nature. Budapest is carefully respecting the Russian sen-
sitivities to a certain extent, is in favour of avoiding confrontation, though of course, 
the interests of the EU are of primary importance.
Concerning geography, clearly the three Western-NIS states are the prioritized 
ones; the South Caucasus is practically missing from the Hungarian political agen-
da. However, from the three western states of the eastern neighbourhood, signifi -
cant Hungarian activities are conducted only in Ukraine and in Moldova. The Ukra-
ine-related projects are focused mostly on the Zakarpatya region, directly bordering 
Hungary, and populated by – among others – ethnic Hungarians. Thus from the six 
countries of the eastern neighbourhood, Budapest takes up a policy-maker rule only 
in Moldova, where the Hungarian political presence is relatively strong and high-le-
vel projects are going on.
Concerning policy, the energy security element of the Eastern Partnership initia-
tive is considered being the most important one. It is expected to strengthen the 
energy security of Hungary in many ways. In short term, via improving the regulato-
ry environment and perhaps contributing to the maintenance works of the pipeline 
45 Gergely Romsics – Zsuzsanna Végh: Managing the Future? Prospects of the 2011 Hungarian EU presi-
dency. In: International Issues and Slovak Foreign Policy Aff airs. No. 3. /2009. Research Center of 
the Slovak Foreign Policy Association. pp. 25-48.
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system in the eastern neighbourhood, the security of transit is going to be enhanced. 
While in the long run, the EaP might well contribute to the diversifi cation of supplies 
as well. 
The Hungarian Visegrad presidency has envisaged a set of objectives being not 
only in line with the principles of the Eastern Partnership initiative, but in some 
aspects further developing them. However, the presidency period lasting from July 
2009 to June 2010 has been partially overshadowed by the global fi nancial crisis and 
by the internal hardships of Hungary. Moreover, due to the parliamentary elections, 
scheduled to take place in April-May 2010, in the fi rst half of 2010 most attention will 
obviously be turned to domestic policy. Regardless of the outcome of the elections, 
the general geographic and policy-related priorities of Hungary will not be modifi ed, 
simply because they are defi ned by external factors, e.g. by the energy dependence, 
the minorities living abroad, etc. Thus the pragmatic, moderate nature of Hungarian 
foreign policy towards Eastern-Europe is not likely to change. 
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The Eastern Partnership (EaP) is currently a leading governmental initiative in the 
sphere of Polish foreign policy. The EaP project is undoubtedly valuable and worthy 
of support political idea. Therefore it would be harmful for Polish interests if the EaP 
became a bartering tool in domestic inter-party clashes. Furthermore the EaP should 
be seen in a proper context and dimension. The real debate about the EaP should be 
free of a total critique and at the same time should keep proportion to make both 
decision-makers and public opinion see the EaP as a useful tool for achieving par-
ticular and (which should be noted) very limited aims. However the EaP should not 
be treated as a panacea for all challenges posing in the East, ranging from the war in 
Georgia to the gas crisis. To fi nd an answer to the question of the real meaning and 
scope of the EaP initiative, one should start by relating it to Polish interests. The EaP is 
an instrument used in the realisation of Polish interests, not a goal in itself.
The fundamental objective of Polish foreign policy is to maintain the indepen-
dence of the state. The Polish perspective, being simultaneously a policy goal, denies 
Moscow from being a sole infl uence in the territories to the east of Poland’s border. 
The rest is rather a mean of achieving this objective. Therefore Polish membership in 
the EU and building a strong position within its structures is a tool not a goal. More-
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over strong position is crucial and highly desirable for Poland, and should be occu-
pied actively, however it is neither a goal, nor an action. Using “Polish active position” 
in the political discourse as a goal of the Polish foreign policy, is an attempt to hide 
lack of real programme behind a catchy slogan and serve as an excuse for taking up 
no real action at all.
The principle goal can only be achieved under the circumstances of bring-
ing Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Armenia closer to the West 
(keeping this peculiar order refl ects the importance of neighbouring countries in 
Polish national security aff airs), which means the adoption of the Western systemic 
changes and leaning towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration, in contrast to 
integration with Russia (this process could be described as “the occidentalisation pro-
gramme” 46). Such an ambitious task requires the mitigation of underdevelopment of 
these states caused by long lasting Russian/Soviet domination, thus investing con-
siderable fi nancial resources which Poland does not possess (Poland also deals with 
a similar problem, but on a smaller scale however). Therefore the nature of “the occi-
dentalisation programme” concerning the described region clashes with the imperial 
ambitions of the Kremlin. 
The programme implementation requires prestigious and strong political back-
ground which would enable to enhance eff orts of modernization and democratiza-
tion in the mentioned countries, and at the same time would protect those eff orts 
from being destroyed by the Russian military intervention – just like the one we 
could observe in the summer of 2008 in Georgia.
Military security of “the occidentalisation programme” spread throughout coun-
tries of the EaP agenda yet could not be directly supported by the military forces 
of those countries due to their insuffi  cient potential. One of the solutions used by 
the post-soviet countries is relying on the USA playing a Russian counterbalance. 
This fact has been a base of their pro-American attitude, which is unwillingly seen by 
some infl uential states and political environments in the EU. The fact that Poland and 
the Baltic States are regarded as staunch US allies, or as the Russian propaganda de-
clares “as makers of the Washington’s orders”, weakens the capabilities of those states 
to force through new concepts for Eastern policy throughout EU forums. 
This political factor is easy to discern, however it is not the decisive argument for 
the revision of a pro-Atlantic direction in Polish foreign policy. Unfortunately, there 
46 Taking into consideration the historical grievance of the term ‘occidentalisation’ in the context of 
the cultural traditions of the region in question it is worth stressing that it should be understood 
only in the sense of the westernisation of the political and economic system of the partner coun-
tries and in the sense of their foreign policy strategic political orientation to the West. They should 
become a part of the West in the sense in which Greece is i.e. without renouncing their cultural 
heritage and tradition which link them to the Greek-Byzantine culture rather than to the Latin one.
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has been a gradual weakening of Polish-American relations since Polish troops wi-
thdrew from Iraq, and especially since the fi asco concerning the antimissile shield 
project in Poland and the Czech Republic. The pro-American character of Polish fo-
reign policy is melting down rapidly since the new government came to power in 
Poland in 2007, so is the interest of Washington in the Central Europe under its new 
administration of Barack Obama. The recent declaration of the new Polish-American 
project launch, based on the implementation of the SM-3 1B rockets planned to be 
started for 2015, does not alter the situation. Moreover, a gesture made by the USA 
– a new proposal for Poland in the fi eld of antimissile defence – did not have any psy-
chological impact on Russia as the US Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to Poland (20-22 
October 2009)47, was regarded in Russia as a “comforting visit”.48.
There was a lack of signifi cant reaction from Washington about the Russian in-
vasion in Georgia. Furthermore an announcement was sent from the Obama admi-
nistration that the US wishes to reset relations with Russia, hoping that Kremlin will 
be eager to sign an agreement on strategic nuclear arms control, as well as seeking 
Russian support in solving problems with the Iranian nuclear program or with the 
Afghan war. All these political moves have created the impression that the US no lon-
ger wants to keep the role of the security guarantor in East-Central Europe.49 The shift 
of the American role in Eastern Europe can be a cause for destabilisation and can un-
dermine independence and territorial integration of countries situated in the region. 
Could the EU replace the US role of the Post-Cold War as the order stabilising force, or 
indeed a propagator of Western values and political systems in this part of the world? 
What is the new role that should be played by the EaP? These are the questions I will 
attempt to answer.
Since Poland joined the EU, Warsaw has hoped to gain an institutional infl uence 
on the shape of the EU Eastern policy. There have already been some encouraging 
examples to set up other initiatives: in 1995 Spain initiated the Barcelona Process cre-
ating Mediterranean dimension of the EU Policy50, since 1997 Finland with Sweden 
47 More about: Biden: Nic o was bez was (rozmowa z Piotrem Gilertem), „Rzeczpospolita”, nr 247(8453), 
21 październik 2009, p. A11; compare: W. Lorenz, P. Gilbert, Polska bierze nową tarczę, „Rzeczpospo-
lita”, nr 248(8454), 22 październik 2009, p.A11. A. Cohen, W Polsce żadnej tarczy nie będzie, „Rzecz-
pospolita”, nr 248(8454), 22 październik 2009, p.A17.
48 Rosyjska prasa: Biden przyjeżdża pocieszyć Polskę, Interia.pl, (Tuesday, 20 wrzesień 11:32), http://
fakty.interia.pl/raport/tarcza-antyrakietowa/news/rosyjska-prasa-biden-przyjezdza-pocieszyc-pol-
ske,1384892
49 R. Pipes, Rosja jest teraz dla Obamy najważniejsza, „Rzeczpospolita”, nr 248(8454), 22 wrzesień 2009, p.A11.
50 More about: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, European Commission, External Relations, Euro-
med, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm and: G. Bernatowicz, 
Polityka śródziemnomorska Unii Europejskiej, „Sprawy Międzynarodowe”, nr 4 (XLVIII), październik-
grudzień 1995, pp.63–80.
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have been building the Northern Dimension51. In 2007 the European Commission 
started to promote the Black Sea Synergy52. Poland has not been invited to partici-
pate in this initiative; however it has posed a challenge for the Polish government to 
avoid situation when relations EU-Ukraine, – Moldova, – Georgia etc. would be deci-
ded without Polish participation. On the other hand, this initiative required fi nding 
a place in the EU policy towards Belarus, which is included neither in the Northern 
Dimension, nor in the Black Sea Synergy programmes.
During the pre-accession period (at the turn of 2002 and 2003) Poland launched 
the fi rst initiative for the creation of an Eastern Dimension in EU relations53. At that 
time it ended in failure. The second attempt was made in 2008 and resulted in the 
joint Polish-Swedish initiative of the Eastern Partnership.
Therefore what role within the Polish occidental project targeted to closer and 
further Polish Eastern neighbours, should be taken by the EU and how the role of the 
EaP should be shaped within it? How much space does this role leave for the EaP ini-
tiative pioneered by Poland and Sweden? What were the circumstances of launching 
the EaP? Who supported the EaP and why? What is its nature and essence? What is its 
“added value” in the context of already existing solutions? What are the chances for 
activating EU Eastern Policy using the EaP as a tool and directing it in favour of Po-
lish interests? Which countries are eager to support the EaP and on what scale? What 
partial goals approaching us to the strategic goal can be achieved by the use of the 
EaP? What are its advantages and weaknesses? Should we take them into account 
while thinking about the Polish infl uence on its Eastern neighbours? Should we treat 
them as determinants, or as supporting factors in meeting the challenges standing 
in front of us? What kind of challenges can or cannot be dealt with using the EaP? 
What short-term goals should Poland set within the EaP construction?
Circumstances surrounding the creation of the Eastern Partnership
The announcement of the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean by the 
President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy (13 August 2008) 54 created a good climate for 
51 More about: P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, Polityka Unii Europejskiej wobec Rosji a interesy Polski 1991-
2004, Kraków-Warszawa 2008, pp. 592-646.
52 More about: Black Sea Synergy, European Commission, External Relations, http://ec.europa.eu/
external_relations/blacksea/index_en.htm
53 More about: P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, Eastern Dimension as and Aspect of Common Foreign and 
Security Policy Execution, [in:] “Eastern Dimension of the European Union”, ed. by Monika Zamarlik, 
ISS, Kraków 2004, pp.67-89..
54 Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, Communication from the Commission to the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council Brussels, 20/05/08 COM(2008) 319 (Final), pp.1-13.
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the regionalisation of European Neighbourhood Policy – ENP. Since its creation, 
the ENP has been criticised for unifying all EU neighbourhood countries within one 
scheme. Undertaking similar activities for the East, as are used with the EU partners 
from the Mediterranean Basin, seemed to be a natural decision. The Sarcozy’s initia-
tive has made any criticism of the EaP by the infl uential Mediterranean lobby less 
probable since less credible especially if launched by those who had just created 
such a precedent of the regionalisation of the ENP. On the other hand the French 
initiative has been treated by the Germans with reserve. Germany is the leading do-
nor to the EU budget and the only big country of the “old” EU the main priorities of 
which are oriented rather towards the East than towards the South of the continent. 
In such favourable conditions, the Polish-Swedish initiative could have relied on Ger-
man support as they are interested in slowing down French ambitions that are based 
on drawing attention and attempting to direct the majority of EU funds to the Medi-
terranean basin i.e. to the areas outside of the German scope. Such an essential con-
clusion leads us to the supposition that German support for the EaP initiatives has 
more instrumental than strategic meaning. Motivation is a will for building a counter-
balance to the French initiative, yet not for the real intention to open the EU towards 
the East. Therefore, it should not lead to the conclusion that Berlin is politically and 
fi nancially ready to be active within the occidental programme integrating Ukraine, 
Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan with Western structures. This is 
worthy of note and as has already been shown; the programme in its nature is con-
tradictory to the Russian imperialistic aspirations, which are politically tolerated by 
the powers-that-be resting on the Spree river. Thus, Germany will support the EaP 
in order to limit fi nancial resources transferred to the South, but not to develop any 
perspective for the future accession of Ukraine to the EU.
When the EaP was accepted at the fi rst EU-EaP countries summit in Prague (7 
May 2009), the president of France, along with the prime ministers of Great Britain, 
Italy and Spain, were absent at the meeting. The only top-level representative of 
a large EU member state was Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel. The biggest con-
cern of the German representatives, supported by the Dutch, was that the invited 
neighbourhood countries were not called “European partners” (this could have been 
interpreted as approving their ambitions concerning future membership in the EU) 
but as the Eastern-European partners. Additionally, this happened according to Ger-
man preferences55. This fact should not comprise a delusion, however, as to what ex-
tent Germany can support projects promoted by Warsaw in the EU’s policy towards 
the East. 
55 Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit Prague, 7 May 2009, Council of the Euro-
pean Union, Brussels, 7 May 2009, 8435/09 (Presse 78), p.5. 
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The other issue worth examining is that the EaP has come into power at the time 
of the global fi nancial crisis, which has been much more painful for Russia and for 
the Commonwealth of Independent States, than for Poland and the rest of the EU. 
As a result, the Russian economy has lost its capability to attract EaP countries which 
are looking for solution to overcome the economic collapse in the EU. The EU has suf-
fered less than Russia during the crisis. This situation might lead to the reinforcement 
of the reorientation of the Eastern economies towards the EU.
The circumstances of the EaP’s birth have shown the positive economic context 
that accompanied the naissance of the initiative still a merely declarative support of 
the main EU countries for the EaP initiative. The conclusion is the project unfortunately, 
has small political potential regardless promising trends in the regional economy.
Allies
In the above described example, the Polish-Swedish initiative can be strongly suppor-
ted by its main promoters and a group consisted of the three Baltic States, the Scandina-
vian states and the Czech Republic. There is also a chance in the evolution of the Hunga-
rian politics after upcoming elections, however its traditional scope on the national 
minority issue around the Trianon borders, do not show promising signs for the 
future cooperation with its neighbours. The minority problems among Slovakia, 
Hungary and Romania can be used by Russian agents to paralyse cooperation in 
the region (the current assignment of the Polish government is to hinder Russia 
from realising this scenario in relation to our Eastern neighbours).
Keeping the cabinet of the Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico does not allow co-
unting on Slovakian support for the EaP strategic goals. However, this does not exclu-
de pragmatic cooperation in the border regime issues. Maybe the Slovakian attitude 
towards Russia can change after the recent Russian “gas war” with Ukraine. The qu-
estion is to what extent and for how long can this situation remain?
One of the challenges standing in front of the Polish government is to gain Roma-
nia as a closer cooperation partner. For now, Romania in the fi eld of the EU Eastern 
policy, especially within the Black Sea Synergy, acts as a Polish competitor. Therefore, 
it would be natural to accept the Romanian role in the realm of Moldovan projects 
within the EaP (conditioned to the Polish disagreement about the establishment of 
“the second Kaliningrad Oblast” in Transnistria – a pro-Russian self-proclaimed soviet-
style state that should not be turned into a next exclave of the Russian Federation).
In the context of the Black Sea region, it is important to defi ne the right role for Tur-
key within the EaP. Ankara cannot be treated by the Polish government as one of the 
EU’s neighbourhood countries, but as an approved candidate. Poland’s aim should be 
to convince Turkey that they have an important role in infl uencing the future of the EaP 
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countries as a Polish, not a Russian, ally. Poland should also convince Turkey that the 
EaP is a useful tool to scrap the Franco-German project of placing Turkey in a position 
of an eternal neighbour which cooperates with the EU merely on the ground of the 
exclusion from the institutional process of co-decision (everything but decisions rule)56.
It is probable that Great Britain, as one of the “old” EU Member States, would sup-
port the EaP. Especially since the Alexander Litvinenko murder, Great Britain has been 
conducting more realistic policy towards Russia than the other European states, and 
has been in favour of the geographic enlargement of the EU.
The nature of the project
The EaP in its nature concerns a specifi c development initiative, even extended 
outside the current frames of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) cooperation 
programme with Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The 
six mentioned countries are the Eastern neighbours of the countries that joined the 
EU in 2004 and 2007 and were selected from the countries covered by the ENP. The 
countries remaining within the EaP are off ered:
1. Association Agreement between a given partner country and the EU.
2. Establishment of a deep and comprehensive free trade area – DCFTA between 
the EU and particular countries covered by the programme
3. Cooperation enhancement in the fi eld of common borders control, aiming at set-
ting up a visa-free regime for both sides in a long term perspective, but in a short 
term - liberalisation of the visa systems.
4. Cooperation in the fi eld of energy security.
5. The EU support in the economic and social development of the partner coun-
tries. 
Cooperation between the EU and a particular country should be individualised 
and should be developed within four thematic platforms:
1. Democracy, good governance and stability,
2. Economic integration and convergence with EU policies,
3. Energy security,
4. Interpersonal relations.
According to the EC communication ‘the objectives of the EaP may also be advan-
ced through (...) fl agship initiatives’: Integrated Border Management Programme; an 
56 The Kurdish issue, aggravated by the Iraqi war, has caused a small but noticeable political shift 
of Turkey form the USA towards Iran and Russia. The extended accession negotiations repel the 
nation of seventy million people from the EU. This process is not in favour to the Polish interests. 
Turkey is also a strategic partner concerning the energy resources, its infl uence in Azerbaijan and 
Turan countries of the Central Asia and it is also a transit country for the Nabucco gas pipeline.
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SME facility; promotion of regional electricity markets; energy effi  ciency and renewa-
ble energy sources; development of the Southern energy corridor; and cooperation 
on prevention of, preparation for, and response to natural and man-made disasters.
Structural dialogue planned as an operational instrument of the programme is or-
ganised at four levels: the EaP summits (meetings of Heads of State or Government) 
should be held every two years; annual spring meetings of Ministers of Foreign Aff airs 
from the EU and the partner countries attached to the GAERC; twice a year – meetings 
of senior offi  cials working on the bases of the four platforms mentioned above; the 
four level will be constructed on the base of panels supporting the work of the thema-
tic platforms. Their formats and participants will be determined according to the need.
The inter-parliamentary dialogue structure for EaP – EURO-NEST (EU-Neighbour-
hood East Parliamentary Assembly) – has been created too. It has been set in motion 
on the initiative of a group of the EPP-ED MEPs and it consists of the MEPs and the 
MPs from the partner countries – the latest delegated by their national parliaments 
as well as with the representatives of Belarusian democratic opposition57. (The EU 
does not recognise the legality of the Belarusian “parliament” the members of which 
in fact have been appointed and not elected). 
The third states may participate in the initiative on the case by case principle and 
if there is agreement that common interests in a topic, geographical proximity or exi-
sting economic links would amount to eff ective development of the cooperation.
A total sum of €450 million was allocated in 2008 for fi nancing of the entire co-
operation with the “six” EaP countries within the framework of the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy. However this amount is expected to rise every year to eventually 
reach a total of €785 million in 2013. In December 2009 when the countries had been 
already included into the EaP the European Commission decided to grant additional 
sum of €600 mln exclusively for EaP for the years 2010-201358.
Table 1. Indicative breakdown of EaP fi nancing59
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
euro (mln) 85 110 175 230 600
57 J. Popielawska, W jakim towarzystwie? Partnerstwo Wschodnie na tle innych inicjatyw UE na wscho-
dzie, „Analizy Natolińskie”, nr 5(37)2009, p.7.
58 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Eastern Part-
nership, Brussels, 3.12.2008 COM(2008) 823 fi nal, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex-
UriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008DC0823:EN:NOT 
59 Vademecum on Financing in the Frame of the Eastern Partnership, European Commission External 
Relations Directorate General Directorate European Neighbourhood Policy, 16 December 2009, 
p.6. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eastern/docs/eap_vademecum_14122009_
en.pdf 
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Advantages
The geographic scope of the project refl ects Polish priorities. Furthermore, the 
reservation about Belarus seems to be natural (cooperation on the expert and tech-
nical level until political conditions will be changed – meaning: until the collapse of 
the dictatorial regime there). 
The conditionality rule understood as the – diversifi cation of the EU policy to-
wards particular countries, determined by their ambitions and expressed will to co-
operate, follows through the Polish postulate that was already included in the East-
ern Dimension project in 2003. The project promotes Ukraine as the most advanced 
state in the fi eld of the EU approach, and strongly declares its European ambitions, 
which also correspond to Polish interests. However, there is a need to abolish the 
conditionality rule for Belarus, because sustaining this modus operandi would provide 
Lukashenka with major initiative to improve relations with Brussels or to increase iso-
lation of his fellow-citizens from “a negative infl uence of the West”.
The EaP was supported not only by Poland but also by neutral Sweden, which 
apart from an administrative benefi ts (the Swedish have more experience in oper-
ating in the EU institutions and comparing to Poland, a more developed public ad-
ministration), also emphasises the European character of the EaP initiative which 
facilitates bringing it to the top of the agenda within EU institutions. This fact re-
peals eventual Scandinavian concerns over competiveness between the EaP and the 
Northern Dimension of the EU. The Czech Presidency interest in the EaP, as well as the 
fact that in the second half of 2009 the EU leadership was taken over by Sweden, has 
created an opportunity to promote the development of the EaP project as a leading 
priority of the Presidency throughout the year. The Czechs lead the fi rst EaP summit 
in Prague, however it was held at the time of the government crisis. Unfortunately, 
Stockholm has not undertaken any important activities to support the process of the 
EaP implementation, despite the fact that Sweden was one of the EaP’s co-authors.
A perspective of a visa-free regime between the EU and the EaP countries is the 
most important and the most concrete off er within the EaP. Polish accession to the 
EU implied the introduction of visa requirements for Poland’s Eastern neighbours. It 
became an expensive barrier (the visa costs €35 for Ukrainians and €60 for Belaru-
sians) and due to this complicated procedures, conditions of travel for Belarus and 
Ukraine citizens to Poland deteriorated. This fact was contradictory to the Polish po-
litical interests that require the opening, not closing, for interpersonal contacts with 
the Eastern neighbours. Poland cannot accept the situation when it is more diffi  cult 
to travel to the EU for citizens of the EaP countries, than for the Russian citizens, espe-
cially in the light of the Russian activities of granting Russian citizenship to Ossetians, 
Abkhazians and Armenians in Georgia and Crimeans in Ukraine. The EU has adopted 
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a road map concerning a visa-free regime for Bosnia-Herzegovina60 which is a good 
prognosis and a precedent and can be used by Poland to force analogical solutions 
within the EaP.
The EaP allows countries outside the EU to take part in the programme which 
opens possibility for cooperation with Turkey, and in the energy context even with 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Unfortunately, due to low fi nancial resources the EaP 
cannot be a tool for the realisation of energy investments, but can be politically use-
ful for promoting them. Despite the fact that the EU bureaucracy is slow and unwill-
ing to take risks, an attempt should be made to add an energy dimension to the EaP, 
turning to the Black-Sea-Caspian direction and including the already mentioned 
states. The sooner such an energy dimension would be introduced the better. Energy 
security is a top issue on the agenda, especially due to the positive approach to the 
EaP of the Czech and Swedish Presidencies, and actual psychological consequenc-
es of the “gas war”. Such a situation has already been partially used. In March 2009, 
the EU committed itself to co-fi nance the modernisation of the Ukrainian gas tran-
sit network and to support installation of gas meters on the Ukraine-Russia border. 
Polish diplomacy should have ensured the implementation of these decisions be-
cause such favourable conditions would no longer repeat again. Unfortunately that 
task apparently has not been fulfi lled by the Polish government. No evidence of the 
Polish diplomatic activity to implement the project are known to the public and the 
EU resigned from gas meters installation by autumn 2009 and decided to cover the 
costs of the modernisation of the Ukrainian gas transit network from the EaP budget 
which is “mission impossible” considering the available money and therefore should 
be treated as just the wording process of giving up the project.
Disadvantages
According to Polish plans, the project aims to divide the ENP countries into the 
European neighbours and the neighbours of Europe and to remain open for the for-
mer group with any opportunities concerning the lead to the fi nal stage of the EU 
integration. However, this dichotomy has not been presented in any offi  cial EU docu-
ment. Moreover, according to Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the former EU commissioner 
responsible for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy – Eastern 
and Southern dimension of the ENP, should be treated equally, which in practice 
weakened a positive interpretation of the EaP made by Radosław Sikorski, the Polish 
60 Commission launches dialogue with Bosnia and Herzegovina on visa free travel, Brussels, 26 May 
2008, IP/08/792, Europa Press Released Rapid, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refe-
rence=IP/08/792&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
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Minister of Foreign Aff airs. This negative assessment was proved by decisions made 
under German pressure at the Prague summit.
The EaP fi nancial resources, compared to its great number of tasks, are far too 
low. To compare, Poland within the Phare programme (Poland and Hungary: As-
sistance for Restructuring their Economies) received about €3,9 billion61, which is 
about €300 million yearly, while fi nancial resources for the six countries of the EaP are 
allocated at the level of between €450 million – €785 million per annum in the years 
2008-2013 within the overall budget of the ENP plus extra €600 mln allocated by the 
EC exclusively for the EaP. There will be as well €700 mln available for the EaP initia-
tives within the Neighbourhood Investment Facility budget, still that money are avail-
able for all the countries covered by the ENP and the EaP partners will have to com-
pete for them with the Mediterranean neighbours of Europe62. Therefore, for those 
reasons, the scale of the EU fi nancial support for the EaP countries will not have a sig-
nifi cant impact on “the occidentalisation programme”. Especially, supposing that the 
UE money will be allocated on the EU priorities (“the fl agship initiatives”), rather than 
on the partnership countries’ objectives, i.e. on the development of border infrastruc-
ture enabling an eff ective fi ght against illegal immigration to the EU, or for environ-
mental purposes. Obviously, this is not a step towards any political rapprochement of 
these countries to the West. That situation will not change in the future and Poland 
does not have the necessary tools for correcting this defect. 
It results from the main problem of the EU dimension of the Polish Eastern policy, 
which currently is based on a rule: “We (Poland) have an idea, and you (net payers to 
the EU budget) should pay for its implementation”. This attitude is a consequence of 
a relatively weak economic potential and nature of Polish – European policy. The atti-
tude reduces capability to force through Polish political ideas on the EU agenda. This 
rule cannot be changed within the next 15-20 years and it cannot be replaced by 
a contrary rule: “We have an idea and furthermore, we declare remarkable participa-
tion in fi nancing it”. At the moment, the described disadvantage of the EaP is diffi  cult 
to overcome.
The idea of the establishment of a deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) 
does not have an “added value” for the majority of the invited to the EaP countries. 
This proposal was included in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which 
was signed in the 1990s. The problem is to carry out the project implementation – 
not the political decision on its adoption. The EaP does not include any of the new 
instruments of solving it.
61 PHARE – the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, http://www.dsc.kprm.gov.pl/strona.php?i-
d=48&id2=23 
62 J. Popielawska, op.cit., p.8.
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The importance of the declaration concerning the EU support for integration of 
Ukraine and Moldova with the UCTE (Union for the Co-ordination of the Transmission 
of Electricity) and help with implementation of infrastructural projects concerning en-
ergy supplies and transit system diversifi cation is contested due to the small fi nancial 
scale of such an ambitious programme. In January 2009 the Russian-Ukrainian “gas 
war” showed the EU lack of interest in the solution of Ukraine’s energy security pro-
blem despite the fact the country was covered by the EaP. (On the other side since 
March 2009, Brussels has been interested in defending Ukrainian gas transit infra-
structure from its takeover, resulting from “debts” increased due to excessive price 
dictated by Gasprom)
The goals of the EaP, as they have been declared, are beneath the ambitions of 
Ukraine that wants to have a clear perspective for the future accession of countries 
that will fulfi l the appropriate criteria63.
It is an unrealistic assumption to implement the EaP, simultaneously with the EU 
partnership with Russia64. However, due to political correctness such a statement can 
be treated as inevitable. Still, it can be used by the “Russian friends club” (France, Ger-
many, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia, and Bulgaria65) to block initiatives which are not 
in favour of Russia. 
A slow pace of a structural dialogue with the EaP partner countries implies its 
low eff ectiveness. The EU-EaP countries summits are held less frequently (once every 
two years) than the EU-Russia summits (twice a year – once for each presidency). This 
shows a huge disproportion of frequency resulting in rather ceremonial than work-
ing character of the EaP summits. Therefore, Polish and Swedish or any of the Baltic 
States’s presidencies might come across obstacles and be unable to activate the EaP 
programme. Keeping in mind the presidential character of political systems in the 
majority of the EaP countries, the already accepted rule seems to be astonishing.
63 The Ukrainian government declaration concerning the EaP states: “We believe that the initiative of 
the ‘Eastern partnership’ should envisage a clear EU membership perspective to those European 
neighbours of the EU who can demonstrate seriousness of their European ambitions through 
concrete actions and tangible achievements.” Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs of Ukraine 
Regarding the Development of the Eastern Dimension of the European Union Foreign Policy, May 26, 
2008, http://www.mfa.gov.ua/eu/en/news/detail/13105.htm
64 In the European Commission’s statement is written: “The Eastern Partnership will be pursued in 
parallel with the EU’s strategic partnership with Russia”. Eastern Partnership, Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, {SEC(2008) 2974}. Brussels, 3.12.2008, 
COM(2008) 823 fi nal
65 Cutting off  (in January 2009) gas supplies to Slovakia and Bulgaria can change pro-Rus-
sian policies of these countries. In recent years they acted in accordance with the inter-
ests of Moscow. After the forthcoming elections probably also Hungary will leave “the 
Russian club”.
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There is a disproportion between EU expectations addressed to the EaP coun-
tries (adoption of the EU economic and political regulations) and the EU readiness to 
demonstrate the fi nancial and political support for reforms in those states.
Conclusions
The Eastern Partnership initiative is a programme dedicated to a long-term ef-
fect of the EU countries of its Eastern neighbourhood with minimum use of fi nan-
cial resources and political incentive (no clear perspective for these countries future 
accession to the EU). This practice does not result from mistakes made by the Polish 
government at the planning stage of the initiative, but from the EU weaknesses itself. 
Brussels is unable to accept real political and fi nancial commitments indispensable 
to meet the challenges that emerge in the East. Therefore the EaP displays a major 
weakness, playing the role of the main tool for the activities targeted to the Eastern 
countries. Consequently it cannot be treated as a principal instrument of the occi-
dentalisation of the region in question.
In the light of such conditions, Poland should concentrate on:
1. Using the EaP in forcing through a maximal liberalisation of visa-free regime, le-
ading to visa abolishment for the partnership countries, especially for Ukraine 
(due to its importance), Belarus (due to a need for breaking an isolation of its 
citizens from the Western infl uence) and Georgia (due to the action of granting 
Russian citizenship not only in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but also in Javakheti, 
settled by Armenians, representing the local majority).
2. Making the EaP a political forum for discussion on the energy security of the region 
(in spite of the economic weakness of the initiative) and a tool to promote the idea 
of solving energy problems of the EU in cooperation with the EaP countries.
3. Promoting participation of the local youth and scientists in the EU education pro-
grammes (Socrates-Erasmus).
4. Directing EU funds for reconstruction and conservation of the European cultural 
heritage monuments in the EaP countries.
5. Analyzing the possibility of using the EaP programme (in the context of deterio-
ration of the Russian economy) for strengthening economic relations between 
Poland and the EaP countries. This task should be the main priority for the go-
vernment economic experts, in order to be ready for implementation during the 
Polish Presidency in 2011.
In contrast, the EaP programme cannot be used as tool helping to oppose the 
Russian military pressure directed on Georgia, or on any other partner country. Ne-
ither within the EaP, nor within any other activity, the EU cannot replace the impor-
tance of the USA – the hard power in the region. The slogan concerning work in-
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tensifi cation within the EaP, which has been repeated since August 2008, however 
in the light of Russian invasion on Georgia, it turns out to be a misunderstanding. 
There have not been constructed EaP mechanisms that are specifi cally built to face 
similar challenges. A military crisis cannot be solved by introduction of political and 
economic cooperation programmes, because their results cannot be demonstrated 
at the time of crisis, but rather in a long term perspective. Moreover, the EaP will not 
become the leading tool of energy security promotion in the region. As it requires 
very expensive investments in infrastructure, it cannot be fi nanced from the already 
planned budget.
The Eastern Partnership in the current shape cannot be treated as the main tool 
of Polish Eastern policy. This tool is useful, yet insuffi  cient. Therefore, it should be de-
veloped in accordance with the fact that NATO’s Partnership for Peace was built as a 
substitute off er which enabled to avoid full NATO membership of the Central Europe-
an countries. However, due to Polish diplomacy eff orts and the other countries from 
the region, the Partnership for Peace was transformed into a path towards joining 
NATO, opened for countries which wanted to follow it. A similar evolution of the EaP 
would be much more diffi  cult to carry out, but such a scenario has to be taken into 
account. The current shape of the EaP has been formed for a long term perspective. 
Thus, Polish incentives for bringing its Eastern neighbours closer to the West, which 
is being demonstrated on the EU forum, are important but not decisive. In order to 
make the considerable political shift of the EaP countries towards the West, Poland 
should gain the active support of the EaP countries, countries from the region (Baltic 
States, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Turkey) and in Washington (unfortunately 
according to the reduced possibilities that are off ered by the new Barack Obama’s 
Presidential Administration). In the EU arena, Poland should treat the EaP as a plat-
form for political consolidation of the EaP countries. Consolidation, once achieved, 
could be used in other fi elds of the EU policy, also in the foreign one. The EaP de-
velopment should not be a Polish excuse to avoid independent undertakings per-
formed with the Eastern neighbours. Such activities based on bilateral relations or 
on regional coalitions – i.e. the Georgia crisis case – have been the most important 
instruments of the Polish infl uence on the region.
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There are at least three main reasons why the EU’s Eastern Policy, especially its 
new tool – the Eastern Partnership (EaP), plays an important role in the context of 
strategic directions of the Visegrad Group (V4).
Firstly, the Eastern dimension of the EU’s policy, can be a “lever of subjectivity” 
of our region. This is connected with two important processes occurring in the Eu-
ropean system: 1.forming internal hierarchy between the EU Member States, which 
is a natural consequence of constant accessions and 2. process of “externalization of 
the EU’s policies”, which is a tool of infl uence on the EU’s international environment.
The EU Member States’ hierarchy can evolve into diff erent variants – to simpli-
fy this issue, one can point out only extreme issues related to the V4 interests. The 
hierarchy can follow unfavorable formula of “centers of integration”, which would 
mean that the real power and infl uence of the Community’s political processes will 
be focused on a limited group of the most important players. They will play a role of 
“distributors of integration” and according to their interests they would be able t inc-
lude or exclude weaker states from deepening of the integration process. This variant 
can be an important argument for abandonment of solidarity mechanisms of the 
EU’s policies, and for establishment of internal competiveness system. It would also 
sentence mostly weaker countries to periphery. Such states due to their small size, 
relative poverty and secondary formal power (expressed by number of votes in the 
Council) have small political potential, which does not guarantee them involvement 
in the European compromises Consequently such situation like tsunami, would wash 
off  from the European policy, non-egoistic agreements like i.e. the Visegrad Group, 
and consequently would also undermine its sense of existence in its current shape. 
On the other hand, there is also more positive approach towards the internal hierar-
chy, defi ned as – “functional regionalization” of the EU. This idea identifi es particu-
THE EU’S EASTERN POLICY AND THE STRATEGY
OF THE VISEGRAD GROUP
Krzysztof Szczerski – PhD in political science, 
Vice-director of the Institute of Political Science and 
International Relations of the Jagiellonian University, 
expert of the Kosciuszko Institute. Under-Secretary of 
State at the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀ airs of the Republic 
of Poland (2007) and in the Oﬃ  ce of the Committee for 
European Integration (2007/2008). 
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lar kind of political specialization of European macroregions composed of countries 
characterized by their competences, interests, and tools of infl uence; moreover, such 
idea has already been used i.e. while establishing personal compromises concerning 
nominations for the most important positions in the EU’s institutions in which Mem-
ber States try to fi nd geographical and political balance. In the far-reaching context 
one can consider that some factors of this idea would be institutionalized by balan-
cing voting weight in the Council, positions of important Commissioners, positions 
in the External Service or number of seats in the European Parliament – allocated not 
for one country by for regional groups of countries. Such variant would be an op-
portunity for the V4 countries to gather within one group and jointly reinforce their 
own potential. Both, in the fi rst – negative and in the second – positive variant, the 
EaP within the EU’s Eastern Policy can play an important role of “bargaining counter”, 
which can be used while competing for political position, or as an argument for sub-
jectivity of regional integration. This issue is related to the phenomenon of externa-
lization of the EU’s policies, which from a perspective of subjectivity is an important 
factor determining evolution of the European policy, resulting from global strategy 
for locating EU in the world order. The phenomenon concerns gradual “spillover” of 
the European regulatory regime, which infl uences both, direct EU’s environment and 
geographically chosen, global policy issues. The fi rst process is supported by establi-
shment, within the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy, tight partnerships, activities of the 
European Economic Area, or fi nally, strategy for buff ering path of the partner coun-
tries to the EU membership, based on off ering other forms of cooperation with the 
EU. These forms extend from three-element scheme: a third country – an associated 
country – a membership country. Union for the Mediterranean, the Black Sea Syner-
gy or the current shape of the EaP (in long-term approach, it should not be satisfac-
tory, however it will be discussed later) – are goods examples. At the same time, the 
EU develops system of agreements on partnership and cooperation with key part-
ners who have diff erent perspectives for accession, and tries to transfer to the third 
countries (which are preparing to the EU accession) standards and the Community’s 
requirements, long before these countries would be offi  cial EU Members. Such me-
thod of arranging the external environment of the EU can be eff ective, because it 
allows to introduce Community’s regulations without sharing resources – the natu-
ral consequence of joining the system (part of costs are transferred into a candida-
te country). On the other hand, if externalization is not well planned, and is deve-
loped according to internal interests within the European bureaucracy or between 
EU Member States, it would be very energy-consuming and would cause an adverse 
eff ect – transfer unimportant, very specifi c regulations which do not support real ap-
proach to the UE integration and is not an answer for real accession challenges. Due 
to the externalization phenomenon of the EU’s policies, the V4 countries should be 
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capable to join their interests within common mechanisms, in order to include in the 
EU’s component a package of our interests targeted to a particular neighbourhood 
country. Such strategy is conducted by the vast majority of the EU’s countries and 
targeted to regions of their special interests. 
Secondly, the EU’s Eastern Policy and the EaP within its framework, are important 
from a perspective of institutional system, which is placed in the EU’s political system, 
both, within its personal and structural dimension. The personal dimension includes 
fulfi lled by a Pole function of the EP President and by a Czech – Commissioner for En-
largement and European Neighbourhood Policy. The structural dimension includes 
a fact that in 2011, the Presidency of the EU will be held by the two Visegrad coun-
tries: Hungary and Poland. Such accumulation means, that 2011 should be a decisive 
year for our neighbours, as they will conduct their talks with the EU institutions re-
presented by partners from the Central European states –the EP President, the Com-
missioner and the Council representatives. At the same time, it is a great challenge 
for the V4 countries, because such chance will happen once for many years. There-
fore, the Visegrad’s strategy not only should be well organized, but also bearing in 
mind heritage of the Czech and Swedish Presidencies, we should do everything we 
can, to raise the EaP to a special level, which will provide the EaP countries with an 
accession perspective. 
Particular important role can be assigned to the Polish Presidency of the EU. It is 
explained by the fact that Poland, within the Presidency trio, will play a role of a “big 
country”, meaning that Poland should be a natural connector between an informal 
group of main players of the EU (“Big Six” – Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Spa-
in, and Poland) and a collective Presidency consisted of three states. One should also 
hope, that in 2011, the political power of the Polish Presidency and the status of our 
country, will be strong enough to become a real and probable dominant pole for 
setting activities within external relations, especially in the context of crucial agre-
ements with the new EU’s political fi gures – President of the European Council and 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Aff airs and Security Policy.
In the fi eld of pragmatic approach, the key element, infl uencing eff ectiveness 
of the EaP promotion during the Polish and Hungarian Presidencies, will be the al-
ready shaped practice of functioning of these two new institutions. The question 
is whether they will remain subordinated to political will accepted by the Member 
States and will respect the role of a Presidency country, which has an important 
voice in a debate concerning directions of the EU’s external relations and repre-
sentation of the EU’s interests on an international scale, or the question can be the 
other way round – the practice will show that when a country holding a Presiden-
cy of the EU is weak or passive, its role in these EU’s policies will be marginal and 
the power will be transferred to supranational level (informally led by the stron-
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gest players). Furthermore, it will be important, how relations within the European 
Commission, between the High Representative (as Vice-President of the EC) and 
the Commissioner of Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy (this posi-
tion will be taken by Czech), which has much lower positions in the Commission’s 
structure, will be shaped. 
Despite the fact that the personal structure seems to be promising, it does not 
guarantee success neither a major breakthrough in the Eastern Partnership, in the 
next two years. There are a few crucial factors: fi rstly, courageous actions and deter-
mination of Poland and Hungary to build their status in the EU and in formal and 
informal network infl uence, secondly to obtain important positions in the European 
External Action Service (Poland and the other Visegrad countries should eff ectively 
apply for positions of the “EU’s ambassadors” in the EaP countries, because without 
such actions the whole project will be marginalized) and political will to establish, as 
the 2011 political priority, an open path to the EU’s accession for the EaP countries, 
and a natural development of the Partnership idea. However such will has not been 
made and softening of the Presidency content by the Polish government, which has 
been already done, can be worried. 
Thirdly, the Eastern Policy and the EaP are important tests for a strategic dimen-
sion of the Visegrad Group. Mutual and loyal attitude towards the EaP as the V4’s 
political priority, can be treated no only as a crucial condition for the Visegrad’s ef-
fectiveness, but also as a step forward political maturity, close relations, and ability 
to develop off ensive position within the EU policy. Thus the V4 should not be seen 
as a “coalition of insolvents”, who focus on blocking expensive projects like climate 
policy, forced by the wealthiest EU countries.
At the same time one should bear in mind numerous conditions, which can infl u-
ence possibility to realize assumed by the EaP goals.
First of all, one should bear in mind that the Eastern Partnership is not a project 
which is commonly and equally supported by all EU countries. Analyzing the EaP 
from a perspective of the Eastern Policy and the Visegrad’s, but not only Polish, policy 
(assuming full loyalty towards the EaP within the V4), one can divide EU countries 
into three categories: opposing, neutral, and supportive. The fi rst category consists of 
those states whose geographic preferences are located in other regions, and believe 
that setting new priorities of the external policy means undermining current goals, 
or those states which prefer “UE-Russia relations fi rst” approach – as a factor deter-
mining the EU’s Eastern Policy. The second group consist of states which due to their 
small international potential, do not have their own strategic preferences or see no 
obstacles to develop new direction of the EU’s policies. The third group can be na-
med as supportive group, and consists of countries which agree that the EaP realizes 
also their interests. We will focus on countries holding 2009-2011 Presidencies, rather 
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than analyze policies of all EU Member States. According to the already described 
categorization, the division would look as follows:
Opponents Neutral Allies
Spain
Cyprus
Belgium
Denmark
Czech
Sweden
Hungary
Poland
According to a draft characteristic describing environment of our activities, it is 
evident, that there is a strong potential for development of the coherent Eastern Pol-
icy of the EU, however certain conditions should be fulfi lled earlier.
Before we will identify the mentioned conditions, it should be explained that 
particularly important and decisive role, is played by Hungary. This country has un-
clear goals of its foreign policy related not to the EU’s policy i.e. towards Ukraine, but 
rather to the Hungarian attitude towards this relation in the context of Russian and 
inter-EU neighbourhood relations between Hungary and Slovakia. If Russia perceives 
UE-Ukraine approach unfavorably, undoubtedly it will try to undermine this process, 
especially in the EU countries which are open for such arguments. It seems that Hun-
gary, under the current rule, is one of such countries. If the Hungarian policy sup-
ports Ukraine and the EaP, and treats it as a potential for development of the whole 
region, as well as an improvement in relations with Slovakia (this would enable to 
introduce strategic dimension of the V4), then Hungary will become an important 
player in this project.
The second condition concerns the quality of the Visegrad Group. The V4 is in 
a phase of looking for its new identity and a role in the European policy, thus it needs 
to fi nd a new “fuel” to conduct these activities. Undoubtedly, joint setting up priori-
ties of the EU’s Eastern Policy, would be for the V4, a natural fi eld of specialization. 
However such situation is possible only under condition of internal – V4 harmony 
and breaking current impossibility caused by unequal potential of countries, lack of 
engagement of some countries, internal clashes with bilateral relations, and relative 
weakness of the V4 within the EU. The last argument results from the fact that the V4 
was established by so called new Member States, which subjectivity within the EU 
policies, mostly is not in line with interests of the biggest EU’s countries. Some of the 
V4 countries realize policy according to a saying “our home aside”. If the V4 was able 
to overcome internal limitations and actively take part in the EU’s forum, it would 
have a chance to play an important role within it. However, previously, the V4 should 
precise its goals in the Eastern policy and answer a fundamental question “who is the 
main, strategic partner in the East – Russia or Ukraine?”.
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As it follows from the above, draft analysis, introduction of the extended Eastern 
Policy based on the EaP, requires great skills in behaving in the EU’s reality, playing 
diff erent pianos, and developing “small steps” strategy, which will enable to convince 
other key players, and consequently reach critical mass – number and strength of 
infl uence enabling to formulate strategy in line with our interests, which should be 
approved as a part of common interests. 
Bearing in mind political and institutional conditions of the introduction of the 
Eastern dimension, it is worth to point out two main tensions concerning goals 
which should be achieved by the Eastern policy. 
These two, unanswered, fundamental questions regard: fi rstly, do we build 
proposition for structural cooperation (based on multilateral mechanisms), or do we 
promote individual programs for EU approach?; secondly, should cooperation have 
“light” character meaning that it will concern practical issues of the EU’s policies, or 
should it have strategic character leading to the EU’s accession?
Form of cooperation
Structural multilateral Individual
Principle of coope-
ration
Practical policies Type A: the Black Sea 
Synergy 
Type C: cooperation with former 
colonies
Strategic policies Type B: the Eastern 
Partnership?
Type D: Agreements on stabilization and 
cooperation in the Balkan region 
As we can see, there are four possible ways of cooperation with the EU’s Eastern 
partners. 
The fi rst variant (type A) has multilateral and practical character. It means that 
we creates proposition for cooperation within one EU’s policy targeted to a group 
of countries, and every interested country should submit accession proposal. At the 
same time, cooperation will include particular undertakings concerning EU’s sectoral 
policies i.e. environmental policy, transport networks, cultural exchange, joint invest-
ment projects, free trade etc. This type of political model, does not lead to any strate-
gic consequences, but rather is used by the EU to stabilize its environment, transfer 
Member States interests to their direct neighbourhood area, guarantee to share re-
sponsibility for security or development with the neighbourhood countries, connec-
ted with co-fi nancing of such activities. This is the easiest variant of the Eastern Policy 
to implement within the EU, is commonly used (i.e. last proposition of the Black Sea 
Synergy) and can be an eff ective tool for the interested countries.
The second possibility (defi ned in a table as type B) concerns strategic multilate-
ral cooperation. This option consists of the other fi nalité of the EU’s policies realized 
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within particular region, leading to total approach of the partnership countries to the 
EU. The approach could be achieved either through membership off er, or innovative 
formula for cooperation (i.e. selective membership) or association. Therefore, accor-
ding to its assumptions, the aim of such multilateral Eastern policy would be an off er 
of an approach to the EU standards, and cooperation which do not envisage that 
partnership countries will permanently (in a predictable perspective) stay outside the 
EU, but rather that by conducting joint undertakings, will maximally shorten time to 
reach the targeted formula (in this case it is EU membership, which should be off ered 
at the very beginning of cooperation). 
In both variants, it is important to defi ne a geographic scope of countries covered 
by such multilateral cooperation. The fi rst type includes a wide variety of countries, 
therefore it assumes to be an open variant (however, at the same time weak and blur-
red), while the multilateral strategic cooperation assumes stricter qualifi cation proce-
dure for strategic candidate countries. Undoubtedly according to the Polish interests 
and independently on each variant, the Eastern Policy should cover such countries 
as: Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, and Moldova. The problem might arise when all men-
tioned countries will not be interested in this form of cooperation. It can be easily 
imagined that Ukrainian preferences are not related to a practical multilateral coope-
ration, but are clearly inclined to strategic partnership leading to accession (Ukraine 
proved its approach at the discussion about the new EU-Ukraine agreement). Also 
other of the mentioned countries have ambitions for accession (Belarus is only a po-
tential candidate, because its approach to the UE, results from its internal situation 
and type of government). Therefore an off er of practical multilateral cooperation can 
be adopted only temporally, or even can be rejected as unimportant, or even harm-
ful for long-term interests of the partnership countries.
Therefore, one should take into account pressure from the Eastern partners to re-
ject proposition concerning multilateral cooperation within the Eastern Partnership 
of the EU and change it to variants of “individual paths” targeted to particular coun-
tries. Such solution would undermine the whole concept of basing the Eastern policy 
on the ENP mechanisms and instruments (including fi nancial factor). On the other 
hand it will open up much wider possibilities for development of a new policy – adju-
sted to particular needs and consisting modifi ed to each country tools.
Also here we can deal with practical variant of such type of policy (type C), which 
shape is similar to a policy targeted to natural areas of the EU’s infl uence. It seems 
that this type of variant can be used towards countries with long-term perspective 
for future accession, but due to political reasons are important partners (i.e. Central 
Asia and issues of energy supplies).
The last variant (type D) concerns strategic agreements with individual Eastern 
countries, which would be similar to agreements off ered to Balkan states, with clear 
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perspective for accession. Ukraine seems to be in favor of such solution, therefore its 
determination should be carefully examined. At the same time, this variant is defi -
nitely rejected by some of the EU countries, thus is the most diffi  cult to implement. 
Of course, in the background of our analysis, we should keep in mind the role of 
Russia in the Eastern Policy, however it is a separated issue, thus it will not be inclu-
ded in this paper. 
Before Visegrad Group will start battle with its EU partners to convince them to 
favorable variant, our diplomacies should answer all questions raised in the paper. 
Of course we have to be sure which variant is the best opportunity and what are 
expectations of our Eastern partners towards us. Answers will identify our possible al-
lies, who will help us to achieve our goals. The EU puzzles are multidimensional, and 
include specifi c character of the EU policies, which we should learn.
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The EU enlargement perspective and development of closer relations with the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) stimulated debate on the Eastern Ne-
ighbourhood at end of the 1990s. During the accession negotiation panels with the 
member countries of the Visegrad Group (V4), the questions appeared on the aims, 
means and methods of building the future EU Eastern policy.
Within the general objectives, which include propagating the ideas of demo-
cracy, free trade and human rights, the EU Eastern policy remains unchanged. The 
internal dispute among European countries concerns particular aims resulting from 
diff erent needs and interests. For instance, Poland, Germany and Slovakia adopted 
a diff erent political strategy towards Russia. Poland is trying to become a leader in su-
staining partnership with the East, whereas Hungary and the Czech Republic see the 
CIS region through the general debate that is held on the EU forum and frequently 
keep their distance from the problems of the Eastern partners.
The EU Eastern policy (as every external EU policy) is a product of the actions un-
dertaken by the individual countries and EU institutions, mainly The European Com-
mission and a mechanism created over the position of the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Aff airs and Security Policy. As a result, the concepts of 
EU Eastern policy were formulated within the frames of diff erent political and analy-
tical circles in Western, Central and Eastern Europe. Among the most active countries 
in this fi eld it is important to mention Poland, the Baltic States, Germany, France, and 
the Scandinavian countries: Finland and Sweden.
At the Visegrad Group forum, Poland is the most dedicated country in the Eastern 
region. The diff erences between the V4 member states concern the opinions about 
the directions which future EU enlargement should follow. Poland chose the Eastern 
COMPARATIVE STUDY ON THE EU EASTERN POLICY 
CONCEPTS
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scope: Ukraine and Belarus; Czechs and Hungarians – the Southern scope: Croatia, 
Serbia and Montenegro; and Slovakia decided that the Russian position within the 
CIS should be treated with a considerable concern and therefore keeps its distance 
towards EU Eastern enlargement. 
Until now, the most important concepts for EU Eastern policies were: 
1. The New Neighbours Initiative, October 2002
2. The Eastern Dimension of the EU, January 2003
3. The Wider Europe, March 2003
4. The European Neighbourhood Policy, May-June 2004
Each programme diff ers from another one in the aspects of geographical area 
where it was to be applied; the character of EU cooperation with its Eastern partners; 
as well as in the aspect of the mechanisms thanks to which they were to come into 
force. 
Table 1. Comparative study on EU Eastern Policy concepts
Concept Territorial area Authors 
Relation to 
partners
Financial 
resource
NEW NEIGHBOURS 
INITIATIVE
(2002) 
Ukraine
Belarus
Moldavia 
Great Britain 
Sweden
Partnership TACIS 
THE EASTERN 
DIMENSION OF 
THE EU
(1998 – 2003) 
Ukraine
Belarus
Moldavia
Russia 
Poland Integration for the 
most advanced 
countries in con-
ducting reforms
TACIS + UE bud-
get ; as external 
EU policy 
THE WIDER 
EUROPE
(2003) 
Eastern + So-
uthern neighbours 
The European 
Commission
Lack of member-
ship perspectives
TACIS 
EUROPEAN 
NEIGHBOURHOOD 
POLICY (2004) 
Eastern and 
Southern neigh-
bours +
Southern Caucasus
The European 
Commission 
Lack of member-
ship perspectives
EISP (2007) Open 
for Russia 
Source: Self study
1. NNI – New Neighbours Initiative
NNI was the concept of dealing with more institutionalized relations with three 
countries: Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, as future EU direct neighbours. The Initia-
tive was brought on the agenda by the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Sweden 
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in October 200266. The fact of choosing these Eastern countries, as the direction for 
initiating EU future partnership, provoked a wide discussion among the countries like 
France and Spain which prefer cooperation with the South and they also interpre-
ted this situation as a promise for future Eastern accession. Furthermore, EU relations 
with its biggest Eastern neighbour, the Russian Federation, were unclearly defi ned 
and as a result it provoked further controversy. 
2. The Eastern Dimension of the EU
The most ambitious proposition of shaping relations with the Eastern neighbour-
hood was put forward by the Polish delegation during its accession negotiations in 
1998. Warsaw wanted to take advantage of its historic experience in sustaining of the 
contacts with the countries from the Eastern regions and building a strong political 
position in the EU and in the East. Simultaneously, the Eastern Dimension proposi-
tion was in accordance with the EU external policy specifi cation at that time, within 
the framework of which the regions of the EU particular interest were defi ned: the 
North (Northern Dimension), the South (within the framework of the Bologna Pro-
cess) and the Balkans (realised by the Stability Pact for the South Eastern Europe). Po-
land decided to strengthen an Eastern direction in the external EU policy.
In January 2003, the fi nal proposition for the creation of the Eastern Dimension of 
the EU was presented. It was a programme prepared by the Polish Foreign Ministry 
entitled: Non-paper with Polish propositions concerning the future shape of the enlarged 
EU politics towards the new Eastern neighbours 67.
The geographic area of the Eastern Dimension (ED) encompassed four countries: 
Ukraine, Belarus, Moldavia and Russia. It was designed as a regional action strategy 
towards new EU neighbours on the East. The objective of this concept was to coor-
dinate EU activities in the region and overcome the separation of Europe resulting 
from its enlargement. 
The pivotal element of the ED was a promise of EU membership for the most 
advanced countries in passing EU reforms and fulfi lling the conditions of accession. 
Such a European perspective was particularly attractive for Ukraine and Moldova 
which declared the will for integration with the EU. In contrast, building fi nancial 
and political instruments adjusted to Russian and Belarusian conditions was much 
more diffi  cult. Such requirements demanded the establishment of specifi c instru-
66 NEW NEIGHBOURS INITIATIVE, Draft Council conclusions, Brussels, 12 November 2002, (source URL: 
<http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/st14/14078en2.pdf>, March 2007)
67 Non-paper with Polish propositions concerning the future shape of the enlarged EU politics towards 
the new Eastern neighbours, „The Bulletin of the European Union”, (source: www.msz.gov.pl ).
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ments such as technical help and coordination of EU supporting activities, as well 
as facilitating the achievement of the above mentioned aims in those countries. Fur-
thermore, two other programmes: TACIS CBC and INTERREG had to be adapted and 
coordinated. Additionally, the accessible resources had to be used in a more prof-
itable way. Polish propositions included the creation of the European Democratic 
Fund or the European Freedom Fund, which would enable the accomplishment of 
aid programmes managed by the non-governmental organizations in every single 
country. These Funds were meant to be created in order to promote democratic val-
ues through the transfer of knowledge essential to undertake the process of trans-
formation. 
3. The Wider Europe
The pivotal concept supporting the shape of EU Eastern policy appeared in March 
2003. It was proposed by the European Commission in a form of a document Wider 
Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours68. This document aimed to be a comprehensive vision presenting EU po-
licies in relation to the states that are not yet invited to join the EU structures. This 
concept was of a great diff erence to the Polish concept of the Eastern Dimension. 
Above all, the territorial aspect of this policy changed and took into consideration 
the interests of neighbours from the East as well as from the South69. By the means of 
the concept of Wider Europe, the EU wished to build a stable model of cooperation 
by promoting equal rights and opportunities among all neighbours. The EU has alre-
ady signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, 
or Association Agreement with Morocco, Tunisia, Israel, Palestinian National Authority, 
and Jordan, but it wished to create a new framework for cooperation based on mutual 
interests and dialogue. For these reasons, the EU proposed the Action Plans which were 
to be negotiated individually with every single state signing the agreement. In order to 
stimulate neighbour countries towards passing reforms, the EU proposed a number of 
concessions for the most advanced countries in this process. In Wider Europe – Neigh-
bourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours the 
European Commission declared its readiness for supporting reforms in the neighbo-
uring countries, the chance for the rise of fl exibility in the visa regimes and also addres-
sed the need for extending the scope of aid programmes. The Commission suggested 
68 Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neigh-
bours, Brussels, 11.3.2003, COM (2003) 104 fi nal, (source URL: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/
pdf/com03_104_en.pdf ), (September 2007)
69 Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neigh-
bours, op. cit.
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the actions which would gradually help to move forward the process of integration of 
neighbour countries with the European Single Market, particularly with reference to 
Russia, recognized as a key partner of the European Union70. Russia was not interested 
in the EU neighbourhood proposition, fi nding its previous achievement in partnership 
with the EU as perfectly suffi  cient and underlining an individual Russian approach to-
wards the organization. Since 2003, Russia has been building “a strategic partnership” 
with the EU within the framework of “EU-Russia Common Spaces” and does not want to 
be treated as one of the EU neighbours.
4. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
In 2004, several days after EU enlargement with Central and Eastern Europe, the 
fi nal concept on the EU policy towards the new neighbours was published. On the 
12th May 2004 the European Commission presented European Neighbourhood Po-
licy Strategy Paper71. It was then approved by the European Council (17-18 June 
2004)72. The countries from the Southern Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Geor-
gia – territories of Russian vital interests, were joined to the European Neighbourho-
od Policy (the Southern and Eastern group).
In principle, the European Neighbourhood Policy is based on inter-pillar coopera-
tion between the EU institutions, with determined participation from member states. 
Every single time, the EU negotiates the Action Plans with countries involved in the 
ENP. Among the concessions accorded to every neighbour country, wanting to pass 
internal reforms, were: softening restrictions in the visa regimes and access to the in-
ternal market. Reforms were passed over fi nancial assistance for EU neighbours. Sin-
ce January 2007, the EU has adopted a new fi nancial instrument advantageous also 
for Russia – the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). Russia 
does not take advantage of the ENP, but is a “strategic partner” of the EU.
***
After having carried out a comparative study of the above mentioned Eastern po-
licy concepts, one may conclude that the ENP occurs on two platforms. Within the 
70 Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: a New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neigh-
bours, op.cit.
71 European Neighbourhood Policy STRATEGY PAPER, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION, 
Brussels, 12.5.2004, COM(2004) 373 fi nal, (source, URL < http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/
strategy/ strategy_paper_en.pdf>, September 2007).
72 Presidency Conclusions – Brussels, 17 – 18 June 2004, 10679/04, (source URL: http://www.con-
silium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/PL/ec/81052.pdf, November 2007).
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fi rst, EU holds particular relations with Russia which in practice remain less clear. The 
second platform refers to relations with other Eastern partners which are based on 
the EU Neighbourhood Policy principles. EU off ers its assistance for those countries 
undergoing the EU transformation process and supports the programmes focused 
on the cooperation within borderland. Moreover, EU is ready for a long-term and 
multifunctional partnership, however without promising membership for any of the 
Eastern neighbours.
The publication Eastern  Par tnership in the context of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and V4 agenda  aims to conclude Polish, Czech and 
Hungarian efforts into the Eastern Partnership inauguration as well as 
presenting future objectives of the Hungarian and Polish EU Presidency 
in 2011 in the matter of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU 
Enlargement Policy and cooperation within the Eastern Partnership.
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